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1 Introduction
Modern risk management theory is grounded in the observation that information asymme-
try between managers/insiders and investors/outsiders limits the ability of rms to raise
external funds. In a striking reversal of Modigliani and Miller propositions (1958, 1963),
not all value-creating rms or projects are nanced (Holmstrom and Tirole (2000), Tirole
(2006)): protable but cash constrained rms may not be able to renance themselves
after a negative shock to their cash ow, hence may go bankrupt; rms with insu¢ cient
internal funds may have to forego protable investment opportunities, an issue known as the
underinvestment problem.
The interaction between costly external nancing, underinvestment, and risk manage-
ment was rst modeled in a two-period environment by the two seminal articles Froot et
al. (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998). The former considers a rm facing random cash
ows, random investment opportunities, and convex cost of external nancing. At the opti-
mum, the rm fully hedges if cash ows and investment opportunity are uncorrelated, and
reduces its hedging as the correlation between both sources of uncertainty increases. The
latter introduces capital structure as a risk management device. A marginal increase in eq-
uity raises the rms capacity to pursue risky investments. On the other hand, it generates
deadweight costs, arising for example from the tax deductibility of interest payments. The
optimal equity level balances these two e¤ects.
A more recent literature has examined this issue in multi-period models. Rochet and
Villeneuve (2011) develop an innite-horizon, continuous-time model, where a constant-size
rm faces exogenous cash ow shocks and stringent nancial frictions: the rm is liquidated
as soon as its cash reserve becomes negative. At each instant, the rm selects its dividend
payment and decides its hedging ratio or insurance coverage for discrete risks. Rochet
and Villeneuve (2011) restate the risk management problem as an inventory management
problem, where the cash reserve is the state variable, and dividend payment and risk transfer
decisions are the control variables. They then show that the rm pays dividends if and only
if the cash reserve exceeds a threshold, and it fully hedges if the cash reserve is below the
threshold. In addition, they show that the rm insures small risks but not large ones.
Bolton et al. (2011) extend Rochet and Villeneuve (2011), most notably by including (i)
investment and growth, and (ii) less stringent nancial frictions, i.e., renancing is possible,
albeit costly. They rst characterize the optimal dividend distribution, investment, and
renancing policies. As Rochet and Villeneuve (2011), Bolton et al. (2011) nd that the
rm optimally distributes dividends if and only if its cash reserve (as a percentage of its
size) exceeds a given threshold. The optimal investment policy departs from the Modigliani
and Miller rule, which is to equalize the marginal cost of adjusting physical capital to the
marginal value of capital (the marginal Tobins q). Bolton et al. (2011) show that the
marginal cost of physical capital is set equal to the ratio of the marginal Tobins q over the
marginal cost of nancing. Finally, they determine the optimal hedging policy, that balances
the marginal benets and costs of hedging.
2
While these two last articles are signicant conceptual contributions, they do not capture
essential real-world features. First, corporate taxes and leverage are absent from these
analyses, even though they play an important role in corporate decision making, in particular
hedging and capital structure decisions, as found for example in Graham and Rogers (2002)s
econometric analysis of the determinants of hedging. Second, as observed for example in
Graham and Harvey (2001)s survey of nancial executives, managers at large, publicly
traded rms use the Net Present Value (NPV) of the free cash ows, discounted at the
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), to make capital budgeting decisions, while
managers in these analyses maximize the NPV of dividends. Finally, at least a fraction of
investment opportunities appears to be stochastic, as was modeled by Froot et al. (1993).
Firms growth is shaped by the availability of investment opportunities as well as by real
frictions in adding capital.
We are not aware of any model derived from micro-foundations that incorporates these
essential features. Furthermore, micro-founded models rely on information asymmetry, whose
parameters are by nature di¢ cult to estimate, hence these modelspredictions are di¢ cult
to test empirically (Graham and Harvey (2001) and Graham and Rogers (2002)).
Therefore, to approximate reality, Léautier et al. (2007) have developed a reduced-form
model, that aims to represent what rms actually do: managers make capital budgeting
and hedging decisions to maximize the NPV of the free cash ows (consistent with Graham
and Harvey (2001)s nding) in a multi-period environment (as in Rochet and Villeneuve
(2011) and Bolton et al. (2011)), facing uncertainty about both future cash ows and future
investment opportunities (as in Froot et al. (1993)). Financial frictions are incorporated
through the expected return required by investors, which is assumed to be convex in the
rms leverage ratio, and replaces the cash reserve as the state variable.
This article builds upon Léautier et al. (2007), and incorporates two additional features:
dividends distribution and the possibility of bankruptcy. This representation of managerial
decision-making cannot be derived from micro-foundations. Yet, it provides valuable insights
for two reasons. First, as previously mentioned, it describes the behavior of large publicly
traded corporations, that make capital budgeting and hedging decisions using the NPV of
the free cash ows, recognizing that the discount rate is a U -shaped function of leverage ratio
(Graham and Harvey (2001), Pettit (2007), pp. 110-111 and 141-159, and Cohen (2003)).
Thus the analysisimplications can be tested on data.
Second, we believe it provides an adequate representation of the value of risk management
in the presence of two nancial frictions: (i) tax deductibility of interest payments, and
(ii) information asymmetry between managers/insiders and investors/outsiders. Most of our
results hinge on the average Tobins q, i.e., the market-to-book value of the rm, being a
concave function of leverage with a unique maximum on [0; b], where b < 1. This e¤ect
is produced in our model by the convexity of the expected return required by investors.
We argue later in this article that this shape of the average Tobins q is consistent with
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micro-founded models such as Biais et al. (2007), and Biais et al. (2011), that derive
the dynamically optimal nancial contracts resolving the underlying repeated moral-hazard
problem between managers/insiders and investors/outsiders. In other words, we believe our
model constitutes a robust approximation of what rms should do.
Our contribution is therefore to solve analytically for what rms do, which constitutes
an approximation of what they should do. We rst determine analytically the optimal risk
management strategy, i.e., the mix of hedging, dividend distribution, renancing, and invest-
ment policies. Second, we illustrate the optimal strategy for a "representative" industrial
rm, using estimates of the main parameters. Finally, we show that the models predictions
are consistent with empirical observations.
The main results are summarized below.
The optimal risk management strategy is surprisingly simple. First, dividend distribution
and investment jointly follow four regimes (Proposition 1). For low leverage, the rm enjoys
full nancial exibility: it fully nances its investment needs, and distributes dividends
to reach its optimal leverage ratio, which maximizes its expected continuing value. For
intermediate leverage, the rm faces nancial tightness: its still fully nances its investment
needs, but no longer distributes dividends, while leverage increases from one period to the
next. For higher leverage, the rm faces a nancial constraint : it is no longer able to fully
nance its investment needs. The portion it nances is determined to reach a target leverage,
after which the marginal value of investing becomes negative. Finally, for high leverage, the
rm faces nancial hardship: it is no longer able to nance any of its investment needs, not
even depreciation.
Second, full hedging is optimal unless leverage gets higher than some threshold, in which
case gambling for resurrection becomes optimal (Proposition 2). This results di¤ers from
Rochet and Villeneuve (2011) and Bolton et al. (2011), who nd that, when the rms cash
reserve (or cash-to-capital ratio in Bolton et al. (2011)) is high enough, the rm becomes risk
neutral, and, since hedging is costly, stops hedging. In our model, the tax shield drives the
concavity of the value function, hence the optimality of full hedging. By choosing leverage
as the state variable we are able to capture the tax shield from debt, a real e¤ect, absent
from Rochet and Villeneuve (2011) and Bolton et al. (2011).
An essential nding of the analysis is that, if the rms expected protability is lower than
a threshold, function of its investment opportunity, the rm does not exhaust the benets of
the tax shield, rather it keeps an equity cushion (Proposition 3): the optimal leverage target
is lower than the static optimum, that minimizes the cost of capital.
The optimal risk management strategy is robust to changes in volatility of operating cash
ows and to the imposition of a constraint on the rms ability to hedge.
This analysis yields a series of testable implications: First, Proposition 1s predictions
that, ceteris paribus, dividend distribution decreases when rms are less protable on aver-
age or face face higher investment opportunities, are conrmed by Fama and French (2002).
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Second, the importance of corporate taxes in the decision to hedge (Proposition 2) is con-
rmed empirically by Graham and Rogers (2002)). Third, Graham (2000) reports that even
protable rms with low expected cost of nancial distress hold an equity cushion, consistent
with our model (Proposition 3).
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents
the estimation of the parameters used to illustrate the analysis. Section 4 presents the
optimal risk management strategy. Section 5 examines the robustness of the optimal risk
management strategy to various changes. The concluding Section 6 discusses future research
directions. Throughout the article, all proofs are presented in the appendix, while only the
resultsintuition is presented in the main text.
2 The model
2.1 Timing, decisions, and Free Cash Flow
For t  0, period (t+ 1) runs from dates t to (t+ 1). At date t, the rms invested capital is
It, that depreciates at constant rate  during each period. Depreciation during period (t+1)
is therefore It.
At date t, an investment opportunity arises. The magnitude of the opportunity it is
expressed as a fraction of the invested capital It. Therefore, the nominal opportunity is itIt.
Senior managers do not know in advance when or whether new investment opportunities will
arise or materialize, as this occurrence depends on a variety of factors, e.g., regulatory ap-
proval, operational limitations. Therefore, investment opportunities fit : t 2 Ng are random
variables, assumed to be independent and identically distributed.
At date t, the rm makes four decisions. First, it selects its dividend payout dtIt for the
next period, i.e., the rm commits at the beginning of a period to a minimum dividend. As
will be discussed later, dividend rates are assumed to be non negative, that is,
dt  0: (1)
Second, the rm chooses its investment gtIt for the next period. The rm has the possibility
to replace partially or completely the capital It depreciated throughout the period and to
invest partially or completely in the opportunity itIt, thus
0  gt  it + : (2)
Taking depreciation and investment into account, invested capital at date (t+ 1) is
It+1 = (1 + gt   ) It:
Third, the rm sets its hedging ratio to the underlying source of risk t, as described in
Section 2.2. Finally, the rm may distribute extraordinary dividends ~dtIt 1 under conditions
described in Section 2.3.
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Throughout period (t+ 1), the invested capital It generates stochastic Return On In-
vested Capital (ROIC)1 xt+1, expressed in percent. The Net Operating Prot after Adjusted
Taxes (NOPAT) realized during period t is t+1 = xt+1It: The Free Cash Flow (FCF) is the
NOPAT minus the net increase in invested capital It+1   It = (gt   ) It :
FCFt+1 = (xt+1   gt + )It:
2.2 Hedging technology
The random variable zt+1 represents the primitive source of uncertainty that a¤ects the
ROIC during period (t+ 1). For example, for an oil company, zt+1 is the wholesale crude oil
price (multiplied by its per-period production, less operating costs, taxes and depreciation,
divided by invested capital). Returns on invested capital fzt : t 2 Ng are assumed to be
serially independent and identically distributed through time. This assumption implies that
the rm does not diversify its investments.
The rm can costlessly hedge its entire exposure to risk zt+1. This assumption may appear
unreasonable. We acknowledge this limitation, and consider this simplifying assumption as a
rst step towards a more general model. We argue in Section 5 that relaxing this assumption
does not signicantly modify the structure of the risk management strategy. Finally, we
assume that the forward price is equal to the expected spot price. The ROIC xt+1 is then:
xt+1 = tE[z] + (1  t) zt+1:
E[xt+1] = E[z] for all values of t: hedging does not a¤ect expected protability. However,
as expected, hedging modies the protabilitys volatility:
Var(xt+1) = (1  t)2Var(z):
We assume that Board of directors, concerned that derivatives are used to speculate,
prevent the rm from using derivatives to either (i) increase its exposure, or (ii) become
short its underlying exposure. For example, an oil company that buys oil forward, i.e., sets
t < 0, increases its exposure, as (1  t) > 1. On the other hand, an oil company that sells
more oil forward than its production, i.e., sets t > 1, becomes short the underlying risk as
(1  t) < 0. Hence, we assume:
0  t  1: (3)
2.3 Leverage dynamics
The rms capital structure at date t is a combination of debt Dt and equity Et. The rms
leverage ratio is t = DtIt .
1See for example Copeland et al. (1995)
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The rm is assumed to not issue shares, which is consistent with theoretical models as
well as empirical evidence. The "pecking order" theory of nancing (Myers and Majluf
(1984)) suggests that rms nance their growth rst by using retained earnings, then by
issuing debt, and only when the two other sources are exhausted, by issuing equity. The
economic reasoning is that, by issuing shares, managers and existing shareholders, who have
superior information on the true value of the rm, signal to outside investors that they
believe that the rm is worth less than the o¤ered share price. As a result, investors heavily
discount seasoned equity o¤ering. This e¤ect is conrmed by the data. Seasoned equity
o¤erings usually yield a permanent fall in the stock price of about 3% (see Tirole (2006),
page 101, and the references therein). As a result, rms are reluctant to issue shares. Rajan
and Zingales (2003) report that the fraction of gross xed-capital formation raised via equity
(including initial and seasoned equity o¤erings) in 1999 was only 12% in the United States,
9% in the United Kingdom and France, 8% in Japan, and 6% in Germany.
Denoting the after-tax cost of debt by r (t), the nancing ow for period (t + 1) is the
after-tax interest payments2 r (t)Dt; minus changes in nancial structure Dt+1  Dt; plus
anticipated and extraordinary dividends paid during the period

dt + ~dt+1

It:
FFt+1 = r (t)Dt   (Dt+1  Dt) +

dt + ~dt+1

It:
Free cash ow equals nancing ow for the period, hence:
(xt+1   gt + )It = r (t)Dt   (Dt+1  Dt) +

dt + ~dt+1

It:
Dividing by It and observing that It+1 = (1 + gt   )It yields:
xt+1   gt +  =  (t)  t+1(1 + gt   ) +

dt + ~dt+1

where  (t) = t (1 + r (t)) is the debt and its interest per unit of invested capital. Isolating
t+1 in the previous equation leads to the following denition:
t+1 =
 (t) + gt      xt+1 + dt + ~dt+1
1 + gt    = yt+1   
1  t
1 + gt    "t+1 +
~dt+1
1 + gt   
where
yt+1 =
 (t) + gt    + dt   E [z]
1 + gt    (4)
is the deterministic next period leverage, and "t+1 =
zt+1 E[z]

is a random variable of mean
zero and standard deviation unity.
2In fact, since the investment is spread throughout the period, after-tax interest payments are slightly
higher than r(t) Dt. For example, rms sometimes use the average debt: r(t)  Dt+1+Dt2 . This extension
is left for future work.
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Extraordinary dividends ~dt+1 are distributed if and only if there still is excess cash ow
after interest and all outstanding debt has been paid, that is, extraordinary dividends are
~dt+1 = max ( (1  t) "t+1   (1 + gt   ) yt+1; 0)
and t+1 = max

yt+1    1 t1+gt "t+1; 0

: Because the rm is considered bankrupt whenever
t+1  1, then t+1 is set to 1 and
t+1 = min

max

yt+1    1  t
1 + gt    "t+1; 0

; 1

: (5)
Equations (4) and (5) shows that t+1 increases with t and dt, and decreases with "t+1.
The e¤ect of a higher investment level gt is mixed: it increases (decreases) the leverage when
(1  t + xt+1 + ) is larger (smaller) than the dividends plus interest payments per unit of
invested capital

dt + ~dt+1 + tr (t)

.
2.4 Managersobjective function
This article assumes that managers of large publicly traded rms maximize Vt, the total
value of the rm at date t, i.e., the Net Present Value of the free cash ows.
This assumption di¤ers from Rochet and Villeneuve (2011) and Bolton et al. (2011),
who assume managers maximize the value to shareholders, i.e., the Net Present Value of
dividends, and may appear contrary to managersduciary duties. However, it is consistent
with managerial practices: Graham and Harvey (2001) report that 75% of the CFOs they
surveyed use always or almost always the Net Present Value (NPV) as the primary capital
budgeting method, and that this e¤ect is stronger for larger rms. This objective function
is also consistent with ex ante optimization of the value of the rm, as discussed by Welch
(2008, pages 452-454): if a management team announces ex ante it will maximize the value of
shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders, another team that commits to maximizing
the value for all stakeholders can raise more capital to purchase the assets, hence replace the
former.
Firms use a two-step approach for valuation: cash ows are explicitly computed for a
rst period (usually ve years), and a continuing value is estimated for cash ows arising at
the end of that period. Denote (T + 1) the date where the continuation value is determined.
For t  T , Vt, the value of the rm at date t, is
Vt = Et
"
T+1X
s=t+1
 
s 1Y
k=t
D (k)
!
FCFs +
 
TY
k=t
D (k)
!
VT+1
#
; (6)
where VT+1 is the continuing value, D (t) = (1 + w(t))
 1 is the discount factor for the
period ]t; t+ 1], assumed to be a function of the leverage ratio t, and the conditional
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expectation Et is taken with respect to the information3 available at date t. Financial frictions
are incorporated in the value of the rm through the cost of capital w(t). Expression (6)
is equivalent to the recursive denition:
Vt = D (t) (Et [FCFt+1 + Vt+1]) : (7)
2.4.1 Discount rate
The discount rate w(t) is the expected rate of return required by shareholders. Absent
nancial frictions, w() is constant: the required rate of return (or equivalently, the value
of the rm) is independent of the leverage ratio. This is the Modigliani and Miller (1958)
irrelevance proposition.
Financial frictions alter this result. First, the tax deductibility of interest payments
generates a tax shield, that increases as leverage increases. For example, if leverage is
constant and the debt is risk-free, this friction can be represented by a linearly decreasing
w() (see for example Welch (2008), and Copeland et al. (2005)).
If w() was decreasing for all values of , rms would be all debt nanced, which is of
course inconsistent with reality. Information asymmetries between insiders/managers and
outsiders/investors imply that, as leverage increase, the latter require a higher expected
return than under the Modigliani and Miller hypotheses. Tirole (2006), chapter 3, derives
this result using a simple and general moral-hazard model where investors/outsiders must
leave rents to a manager/insider to elicit e¤ort. External nancing available to the manager
cannot exceed a multiple d of her initial net worth A, i.e., the cost of expected return required
by investors is constant until the leverage reaches d
d+1
(taxes are ignored), then becomes
innite afterwards. Welch (2008) provides a clear discussion of these frictions and illustrates
their impact on the discount rate w(). Indeed, its Figure 18.1 shows how including the tax
deductibility of interest payments leads to a decreasing w() while its Figure 19.1 illustrates
how including information asymmetries leads to convex w().
Copeland et al. (2005) conrm empirically the convexity of w(). They estimate w()
for a set of companies using the classical WACC formula:
w() = (1  )ke() +  (1  ) kd()
where ke() is the expected return on equity, and kd() is the expected yield on debt. First,
they start from the yield curve for bonds, that is, the relationship between the yield to ma-
turity of 10-year bonds and their ratings. They notice a strong yield increase between BBB3,
the last investment grade rating, and BB1, the rst speculative grade rating. Second, they
estimate the statistical relationship between debt rating (dependent variable) and leverage
(independent variable). This provides them with an empirical estimate of kd(). Third, they
compute the cost of equity ke() using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Combining these
3The ltration fFt : t = 0; :::; Tg is generated by the random terms, that is, Ft =  fiu; zu : u = 1; 2; :::; tg :
The conditional expectation with respect to Ft is denoted Et [] :
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expressions, they compute w() for each company in their sample. Their Figure 15.16 shows
that w() is convex, and reaches a minimum around the leverage corresponding to a BBB
rating, which contradicts empirically the Modigliani and Miller hypotheses.
Firms use a method similar to Copeland et al. (2005) to estimate their cost of capital,
and recognize that the discount rate is a U - shaped function of leverage ratio (Pettit (2007),
pp. 110-111 and 141-159, and Cohen (2003)).
Following the above discussion, we assume that:
Assumption 1 (Shape of w and r)
1. w () is a continuous, di¤erentiable and convex function on [0; 1] reaching a minimum
at :
2. The discount factor D () = (1 + w ()) 1 is a convave function of  on [0; 1].
3. lim!1w () =1:
4. lim!1
w0()
(w())2
= 0:
5. The interest rate r () is a continuous, increasing, convex and twice di¤erentiable
function of  with lim!1 r () =1.
6. (D)00 D00 is a positive function4 of  on [0; 1] where  () =  (1 + r ()) representes
the debt and its interest per unit of invested capital.
Points 1 and 2 imply that the discount factor D () is a continuous function, increasing to
the left of  and decreasing afterward. Point 3 indicates that, when leverage reaches 1, the
rm is no longer able to access nancial markets and has to declare bankruptcy. To ensure
continuity of the value function, the value to existing investors (shareholders and creditors)
is then assumed to be equal to zero. Alternatively, we could have assumed the market for
corporate control provides an exogenous liquidation value, for example book value. This
extension is discussed in Section 5. The same comment also applies to the assumption that
lim!1 r () = +1. Point 4 implies5 that @J

t
@t
converges to 0 as t tends to 1: for highly
indebded rms, an slight increase in its leverage has almost no impact of the rm relative
value which is already very small. Point 5 implies that  () is a non-negative, increasing and
convex function of  on [0; 1]. Point 6 is a su¢ cient technical condition for the concavity of
the relative rm value on some interval [0; b]  [0; 1].
2.4.2 Continuing value
To estimate the continuing value, the rm assumes that from date (T+1) onwards, all values
remain constant:
4f 00 stands for the second derivative of f:
5The proof is available at Section F of the Technical Report.
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 the long-term growth rate of the invested capital is g,6
 the ROIC is E[z]
 the leverage ratio is T+1, hence the cost of capital is w(T+1)
Assumption 2 (Continuing value parameters)
g    < w () < E [z] :
Since for all s  T + 1, xs+1 = E[z]; gs = g, w(s) = w(T+1), and Is = (1 + g  
)s (T+1)IT+1, the continuing value is equivalent to the value of a growing perpetuity of the
expected free cash ow at date (T + 1), discounted by the cost of capital of the rm at date
(T + 1):
VT+1(T+1) =
E[z]  g + 
1 + w (T+1)
1X
s=T+2

1 + g   
1 + w(T+1)
s 2 T
=
E[z]  g + 
w(T+1)  g +  : (8)
Since w(T+1)  w (), Point 1 of Assumption 2 guarantees that the continuing value is
nite and positive.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are su¢ cient to derive the risk management strategy presented in
Sections 4 and 5. They are met for the parameters we estimate in Section 3.
2.5 Dynamic Programming Formulation
From Equation (6), and using the identity
It+s = It
s 1Y
k=0
(1 + gt+k   ) ; s  1;
the average Tobins q vt = VtIt is
vt = Et
"
T+1X
s=t+1
 
s 2Y
u=t
(1 + gu   )
! 
sY
k=t+1
D (k 1)
!
(xs   gs 1 + )
#
(9)
+Et
"
+
 
TY
s=t
(1 + gs   )
! 
TY
s=t
D (s)
!
vT+1
#
6g is not necessarily the growth rate during the last period gT , since the latter may not be representative
of the rms long-term growth potential.
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with the convention that
t 1Y
u=t
(1 + gu   ) = 1.
Because It does not depend on future control variables, maximizing rms value Vt from
date t onwards is equivalent to maximizing the average Tobins q vt = Vt=It. This can be
cast as a dynamic program. The state of the system at date t is described by the leverage
t, and the available investment opportunities it. The decision variables or controls are the
hedging ratio t, the dividend payout ratio dt, the investment level gt, and if necessary the
exceptional dividend ~dt.
Conditional on the state of the rm at date t, the relative value of the rm at date t is:
Jt (t; it) = maxfgs;s;dsgst
s:t: (1); (2); (3); (5)
vt: (10)
Using the continuing value at time T + 1 and taking t = T as the last decision point,
Appendix B shows that the solution to equation (10) veries:
JT (T ; iT ) = max
gT ;T ;dT
s:t: (1); (2); (3); (5)
D (T )

E[z]  gT +  + (1 + gT   )ET

E[z]  g + 
w(T+1)  g + 

; (11a)
Jt (t; it) = max
gt;t;dt
s:t: (1); (2); (3); (5)
t (gt; t; dt;t) ; t = 1; :::; T   1 (11b)
where
t (gt; t; dt;t) = D (t)
 
E[z]  gt +  + (1 + gt   )Et

Jt+1 (t+1 (t; gt; dt; t) ; it+1)

: (12)
As illustrated on Equations (11a), (11b), and (12), leverage interacts with renancing in
two ways. First, it impacts the expected return investors require to hold their investment in
the rm, hence the discount rate D (t). If the rms leverage is low, increasing the leverage
increases the tax shield, hence reduce the expected return required by investor, for the same
free cash ows. If leverage is high, this tax shield e¤ect is overshadowed by a concern that
managers/insiders may protect their interests before those of investors/outsiders, hence the
latter require a higher expected return.
Second, leverage impacts the incremental cost of nancing: as leverage increases, incre-
mental renancing becomes more expensive. Since it does not change the free cash ows,
this does not impact directly the value of the rm. It does, however, impact the value indi-
rectly, through next periods leverage: as leverage t increases, so does the incremental cost
of renancing r (t), hence ceteris paribus next period leverage t+1. The rm may then
need more external renancing. This is the "death spiral", observed in practice.
3 Data and Estimation
We derive in Section 4 the optimal risk management strategy for any functions w() and r ()
and parameters E [z], g, and  that satisfy assumptions 1 and 2. To illustrate the analysis
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for ROIC, Depreciation and Leverage
Median Mean Std. Dev. P1 P99
E [z] 8:4% 7:9% 11:4%  35:6% 27:5%
 5:8% 8:9% 22:5% 0:9% 69:8%
 12:0% 14:4% 8:7% 8:7% 46:8%
The median, mean, standard deviation (Std), and percentiles 1% (P1) and 99% (P99) are based on a sample
of 854 industrial rms from annual Compustat les. For each rm, the return on invested capital (E[z]), its
standard deviation (), and the depreciation () are computed for the period 1990 to 2009. The return on
invested capital (ROIC) and depreciation are computed according to the procedure described in Section 3.
on a "representative" industrial rm, we estimate these functions and parameters using
a balanced panel of 854 industrial rms (rst two digits of The North America Industry
Classication System (NAICS) between 20 and 39) with annual data covering the period
1990   2009. In total there are 17; 080 rm-year observations. Firm data are taken from
Compustat.
3.1 Source of uncertainty
Since the underlying source of uncertainty is not directly observable, we employ the Return
On Invested Capital (ROIC) as a proxy for this variable. The ROIC for rm n at the end
of the scal year t is given by
ROICn;t =
OIADPn;t  (1  )
ICAPTn;t
; (13)
where OIADP (operating income after depreciation) and ICAPT (invested capital - total)
are items from Compustat, and  is the tax rate, assumed to be constant across rms and
years. Following Hennessy and Whited (2007), we select  = 40%, corresponding to the
average combined federal and state tax for rms in the top tax bracket.
For each rm n, we estimate the average ROIC over the period and its standard deviation
across time. Then, to limit the impact of outliers, we use the median values of the resulting
distribution for the analysis, as seen on Table 1. ROIC is then assumed to be normally
distributed, with expectation E [z] = 8:4% and standard deviation  = 5:8%.
The standard deviation of the observed ROIC is probably slightly lower than the stan-
dard deviation of the underlying source of uncertainty, as the former includes rms risk
management strategies. We show in Section 5 that doubling  does not change the structure
of the optimal risk management strategy.
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Table 2: Investment Opportunity and Long-Term Growth Estimates
g    p m H
Point estimate (%) 2:1 21:2 12:6 6:4
Standard deviation (%) (0:32) (0:14) (0:3) (3:3)
Estimation of Equation (14) is based on a sample of 854 industrial rms from annual Compustat les for
the period 1990 to 2009.
3.2 Depreciation
The depreciation rate  is taken as the median value of t, the cross-rm average annual
depreciation rate for year t. Following Eberly et al. (2009), t is computed using the double-
declining balance method, reecting accelerated depreciation in the early years of an asset,
that is, t = 2=Lt where Lt is the average useful life of capital goods for year t (in years),
Lt =
1
N
NX
n=1
PPEn;t 1 +DEPRn;t 1 + CEn;t
DEPRn;t
;
N is the number of rms in the sample, PPEn;t 1 is the previous years book value of
property, plant, and equipment (PPEGT item in Compustat), DEPRn;t 1 is the depreciation
expense (DP item in Compustat), and CEn;t is the capital expenditure incurred in the present
year (CAPX item in Compustat). As reported in Table 1, the depreciation rate is estimated
at  = 12%.
3.3 Investment opportunity and long-term growth
Firmsinvested capital increase in every period depends on the arrival (or not) of an invest-
ment opportunity. Therefore, we assume that at each period, invested capital grows at an
average constant rate g (adjusted for depreciation ) and, with probability p, increases by
a quantity m beyond its normal growth rate. This yields the following panel model for the
invested capital In;t+1 of the rm n at time t+ 1:
In;t+1 = In;t (1 + g    +mBn;t+1 +Hn;t+1) ; (14)
where fBn;tgn;t are i.i.d. Bernoulli variables of parameter p; and fHn;tgn;t are i.i.d. centered
normal variables of standard deviation H . The parameters are estimated using Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE). The MLE estimates, with standard errors in parentheses, of
the panel model are given in Table 2.
Equation (14) allows us to identify (g   ) only. We use our previous estimate  = 12%
to estimate g = 14:1%. Assuming the rms in our sample always invest to the maximum,
comparing equations It+1 = (1 + gt   ) It and (14) yields i = m+ g    = 14:7%.
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3.4 Cost of capital and cost of debt
We compute the leverage of the rm as the ratio between the book value of liabilities and
the total value of the rm as measured by the book value of its assets and liabilities, that is:
n;t =
Dn;t
Dn;t + An;t
; (15)
where Dn;t is the sum of debt in current liabilities (DLC in Compustat) and long-term debt
(DLTT in Compustat), and An;t the total book value of assets (AT in Compustat).
The cost of capital w () is computed in a two-step process. In the rst step, the cost of
capital (WACC) is computed for each rm and for each period using the procedure described
in Copeland et al. (2005), that is, the cost of capital for rm n and year t is estimated using
the formula
WACCnt = (1  nt)kent + nt (1  ) kdnt; (16)
where kent and k
d
nt are the cost of equity and the cost of debt for rm n and year t, and  is
the tax-rate (40%).
The cost of equity kent is computed following the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
Stock monthly-return data come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
The Treasury bill rate, taken as risk free rate, and the expected market return come from
the Fama-French data base available through the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
The rmsbeta at any point in time is estimated by regressing the rms stock return on
that of the markets return based on the previous ve years of monthly prices.
The expected cost of debt kdnt is obtained as the sum of the ten-year zero-coupon yield
plus the expected yield spread according to the rms rating. Expected corporate yield
spreads based on the companys rating come from Chen et al. (2007), while the 10-year
risk free zero-coupon yield is computed following the methodology described in Gurkaynak
et al. (2007). The historical rating for a rm is obtained from the long-term rating of
S&P available in WRDS. Since not all rms have a rating in the S&P rating data base, the
resulting dataset is decreased to 340 rms.
The cost of capital is thus computed rm-by-rm on a year basis. Given that yield
spreads in Chen et al. (2007) are computed for the period 1995 to 2003, the estimate for the
rms cost of capital, WACCn, is computed as an average of the WACCs year estimates
over this period.
The second step is to estimate the function w () using WACCn. The functional form
proposed for w () is
w () =
 
0 + 1+ 2
2

1   ; (17)
where 0, 1, and 2 are coe¢ cients to estimate. As required, this functional form for the
cost of capital is convex in  provided that 0 + 1 + 2 > 0 and has an asymptote toward
1 at  = 1 if 2 > 0. The time-aggregated means of Equations (16) and (15) across
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Table 3: Estimates for the WACC Function
0 1 2
Point estimate 0:1287  0:4159 0:5389
Standard deviation (0:008) (0:071) (0:139)
Estimation for Equation (17) is based on a sample of 340 rms during the period of 1995 to 2003.
Table 4: Estimates for the Cost of Debt Function
0 1
Point estimate 0:0770  0:0248
Standard deviation (0:008) (0:071)
Estimation for Equation (18) is based on a sample of 340 rms during the period of 1995 to 2003.
rms is then used to estimate 0, 1, and 2 in Equation (17) with the Quasi-Maximum
Likelihood Estimator (QMLE). The resulting estimates are presented in Table 3. With these
parameters, the cost of capital is minimized for a leverage value of  = 31:6% and has a
convex shape as shown in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1]
The promised yield on debt kd is assumed to follow
kd () =
0 + 1
1   ;
where 0, and 1 are coe¢ cients to estimate and  is the tax rate. This function is increasing
and monotonic in  provided that 0 + 1 > 0, which reects the fact that debt yield
increases with leverage. 0 and 1 are estimated using the procedure previously described
and presented in Table 4. The after tax promised yield used in the analysis is then:
r () = (1  ) kd () = (1  ) (0 + 1)
1   (18)
4 Optimal risk management strategy
In this section, the optimal hedging, investment and dividends policies are presented. We
rst start with a numerical example which provides intuition for the general case.
The value function Jt (t; it) is represented on Figure 2 for both it = 0 and it = i. For
consistency, all gures are presented for a date t selected "far enough" from the last period
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T that the value function is numerically stationary, that is,Jt   Jt+1 = max
it

max
t
Jt (t; it)  Jt+1(t; it)  10 4:
This criterion translates into (T   t) = 20.
[Insert Figure 2]
As seen on Figure 2, Jt (t; it) admits a unique maximum: for small values of t, increasing
leverage increases the tax shield, hence the relative value of the rm, whereas for large
values of t, increasing leverage decreases the relative value as nancial frictions increase the
expected return required by investors. We also observe that Jt (t; i)  Jt+1(t; 0): when
t is small, the relative value of the rm is larger whenever an investment opportunity is
present, while when t is large, the presence of an investment opportunity has no impact on
the value of the rm. Figure 2 also illustrates that there exists critical value of t, denoted
bt, such that Jt (t; it) is concave for t  bt and convex for t  bt. In our numerical
implementation, the leverage for which the relative value reaches a maximum is 29% when
investment opportunity is present, and 31% when the investment opportunity is not present.
The change in convexity occurs at leverage ratio of 74%. The shape of the value function is
responsible for the optimal risk management strategy discussed below.
4.1 Optimal investment and dividend payments in the full hedging
case
We rst examine the full hedging case, that is, t = 1. To maximize the value function
(t; gt; dt; t) given by expression (12), we compute the rst partial derivatives of , hence
nd critical values that are candidates for the optimal solution. General expressions are
presented at Equations (23)-(26) of Appendix A.1. The full hedging case provides simpler
expressions for the partial derivatives:
@t
@dt
(t; gt; dt; t = 1) = D (t)'
0
t+1 (yt+1) ; (19a)
@t
@gt
(t; gt; dt; t = 1) = D (t)t+1 (yt+1) (19b)
where yt+1 (t; gt; dt) is the expected leverage dened at Equation (4), which is equal to t+1
since t = 1,
't+1 (y) = Et

Jt+1 (y; it+1)

is the rms relative expected value, viewed as a function of next periods expected leverage,
and
t+1 (y) = 't+1 (y)  1 + (1  y)'0t+1 (y) :
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The risk management strategy is derived using a backward induction argument on the
shape of 't+1. Suppose that 't+1 is concave on [0; bt+1] (Induction Hypothesis 1) and reaches
a unique maximum denoted t+1 2 (0; bt+1) such that 't+1
 
t+1

> 1 (Induction Hypothesis
2). Under these assumptions, we derive the optimal controls (gt ; d

t ; 

t ). Finally, we prove
that, given these controls, 't satises Induction Hypotheses 1 and 2 on [0; bt]. The intuition
for the optimal controls is derived in the main text, while the verication of Induction
Hypotheses 1 and 2 is presented in Appendix A.
Suppose 't+1 satises Induction Hypotheses 1 and 2 on [0; bt+1]. Corollary 2 of Appendix
A.2 shows that there exists a unique bt+1 2  t+1; bt+1 such that t+1 is positive if and only
if y < bt+1. These critical values t+1 < bt+1 < bt+1 then lead to di¤erent thresholds which
determine hedging, investment and dividends policies.
Denition 1 Dene (1)t (it)  (2)t (it)  (3)t  (4)t  bt  b < 1 as the unique solution of
the following equations:



(1)
t (it)

= E [z] + t+1 (1 + it)  it;



(2)
t (it)

= E [z] + bt+1 (1 + it)  it;



(3)
t

= E [z] + bt+1 (1  ) + ;



(4)
t

= E [z] + bt+1 (1  ) + ;
and b is the unique solution on (0; 1) of the xed point problem
 (b) = E [z] + b (1  ) + :
From Assumption 1, the function  () is increasing and convex with  (0) = 0 and
lim!1  () ! 1. Consequently, (1)t (0) and (2)t (0) always exist. If the magnitude of the
investment opportunity i is very large, the right hand side of the corresponding equality may
be negative and, therefore, (1)t (i) or 
(2)
t (i) are ill dened. In such cases, they are set to
zero. Assumption 1 guarantees existence and unicity in (0; 1) of (3)t
bt+1, (4)t (bt+1), and
b.

(1)
t (it)  (2)t (it)  (3)t  (4)t where the rst inequality arises because t+1  bt+1,
the second one is a consequence of  > 0 and the third one is justied because bt+1 < bt+1:
Lemma 3 in Appendix A shows that (4)t  bt  b. Moreover, as the right hand side decreases
with the investment opportunity, (1)t (i)  (1)t (0) and (2)t (i)  (2)t (0).
Proposition 1 (Investment and dividends regimes in the full hedging case) Invest-
ment and dividend payout decisions follow four regimes:
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1. For t 2
h
0; 
(1)
t (it)
i
, the rm exhibits full nancial exibility: it fully nances its
investment needs, and distributes dividends to reach its optimal leverage ratio.
2. For t 2


(1)
t (it) ; 
(2)
t (it)
i
, the rm faces nancial tightness: its still fully nances
its investment needs, but no longer distributes dividends.
3. For t 2


(2)
t (it) ; 
(3)
t
i
, the rm faces a nancial constraint: it is no longer able to
fully nance its investment needs. The portion it nances is determined to reach its target
leverage ^t+1:
4. Finally, for t 2


(3)
t ; 1
i
, the rm faces nancial hardship: it is no longer able to
nance any of its investment needs, not even depreciation. Its debt ratio increases.
[Insert Figure 3]
Proof and illustration. In the following yt+1 = yt+1 (t; g

t ; d

t ) where g

t (t) and d

t (t) are
the optimal investment level and dividends rate in the full hedging case. In the neighborhood
of yt = 0, the partial derivative (19b) is positive (Corollary 2 of Appendix A.2). Therefore,
the investment is set to its maximal value, gt = it + , and the dividends are chosen such
that the next period leverage maximizes the rms relative value:
t+1 = y

t+1 =
 (t) + g

t    + dt   E [z]
1 + gt   
=
 (t) + it + d

t   E [z]
1 + it
which implies that
dt = E [z] + t+1 (1 + it)  it    (t) = E [z] + t+1  
 
1  t+1

it    (t) : (20)
The right hand side is a decreasing function of t. This strategy lasts until the dividend rate
is null, that is, for all t  (1)t (it). This produces the almost linear decay of the optimal
dividends policy on the bottom right panel of Figure 2 and the expected leverage plateau on
the left of Figure 3.
For t slightly larger than 
(1)
t (it) ; the rm is still nancially constraint since
@t
@gt
=
D (t) (yt+1) > 0: the optimal control is still gt = it +  as can be seen on the right panels
of Figure 2. In that case,
yt+1 (t) =
 (t) + g

t    + dt   E [z]
1 + gt   
=
 (t) + it   E [z]
1 + it
increases almost linearly, as shown in Figure 3. Since next period leverage is an increasing
function of t, this situation lasts until @t@gt = D (t) (yt+1) reaches zero, that is, until
t  (2)t (it) where t+1


(2)
t (it)

= bt+1.
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Once t > 
(2)
t (it), the optimal investment g

t is chosen according to the rst order
condition @t
@gt
= D (t)t+1
 
yt+1

= 0. This happens if yt+1 = bt+1 which produces the
second plateau of Figure 3. Therefore,
bt+1 =  (t) + gt      E [z]
1 + gt   
;
which implies that
gt =
E [z] + bt+1 (1  ) +     (t)
1  bt+1 :
This lasts until the optimal investment gt reaches 0. Let 
(3)
t be the unique solution to
gt (t) = 0. The decay of the optimal investment policy may be observed at top right panel
of Figure 2.
For t > 
(3)
t ; the rm is so indebted that it can not invest anymore. Consequently,
Jt (t; i) = J

t (t; 0). Next period leverage 

t+1 increases with t. 
Equation (20) shows that, ceteris paribus, when dividends are distributed, they increase
with expected prots, and decrease with the magnitude of the potential investment oppor-
tunity and leverage. Dividend policy is a complex topic, that includes multiple theoretical
considerations, ranging from the tax impact of payments to signalling (see for example Welch
(2008)). One key nding of all CFOs surveys concerning dividend distribution is managers
extremely reluctance to cut dividends (Lintner (1956), Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely
(2005)). This model does not claim to fully explain dividend distribution. However, predic-
tions from the model are consistent with the data.
Fama and French (2002) nd that ceteris paribus, when dividends are distributed, they
increase with expected prots, and decrease with the magnitude of the potential investment
opportunity. Our unreported regression of dividends on leverage and the explanatory vari-
ables used in Fama and French (2001) conrm that dividend decrease with leverage. The
coe¢ cient of leverage is negative and statistically signicant. However, the estimate is much
smaller than predicted by the model, due to the stickiness of dividend distributions.
4.2 Optimal hedging
Proposition 2 (Hedging policy) For any t  T ,
1. The rm fully hedges for t < 
(4)
t
2. The rm gambles for resurrection when t > 
(4)
t .
Proof. We prove in Appendix A that (i) @
@t

t=1
= 0 (Equation (26)), hence, t = 1 is
always a candidate for the optimal strategy, and (ii)
@2
@2t

t=1
= D (t)
2
Z (1 + gt   ) 1 '00t+1 (yt+1 (t; gt; dt))
20
(Lemma 1). t = 1 is the optimal strategy if and only if 't+1
 
yt+1

is concave. Using
Induction Hypothesis 1, this yields:
t = 1, yt+1 2 [0; bt+1) :
From the optimal controls derived in Proposition 1, yt+1 (t) is a non-decreasing function of
t such that
yt+1 (t) 2 [0; bt+1), t < (4)t
(a formal proof is provided in Lemma 2 in Appendix A.4). Consequently
t = 1, t < (4)t :
For t > 
(4)
t , t = 1 is not optimal. Lemma 1 shows that, in that case, 

t = 0.
Corollary 1 Investment and dividends policies described at Proposition 1 are optimal for
leverage t smaller than 
(4)
t :
The hedging decision at date t is driven by the concavity of 't+1 (y) = Et

Jt+1 (y; it+1)

.
For t < 
(4)
t , the rm fully hedges. This result di¤ers from Rochet and Villeneuve (2011)
and Bolton et al. (2011), who nd that, when the rms cash reserve (or cash-to-capital ratio
in Bolton et al. (2011)) is high enough, the rm becomes risk neutral, and, since hedging is
costly, stops hedging. In our model, the tax shield drives the concavity of the value function,
hence the optimality of full hedging. By choosing leverage as the state variable we are able
to capture the tax shield from debt, a real e¤ect, absent from Rochet and Villeneuve (2011)
and Bolton et al. (2011).
For t > 
(4)
t , the rm gambles for resurrection. Since we impose the constraint t  0,
it selects t = 0. In unreported simulations, if the constraint t  0 is relaxed, the rm buys
its risk forward to increase its risk exposure, i.e., chooses t < 0. The intuition is that, if
t > b, then yt+1 (t) > t: hedging leads to certain bankruptcy. Gambling for resurrection
is then optimal. A similar e¤ect can be found in Rochet and Villeneuve (2011), where the
rm chooses not to hedge a discrete and large risk.
4.3 Equity cushion
Proposition 3 (Equity cushion) For any t  T;
1. If the expected ROIC is lower than interest payments (per unit) and the equity fraction
of the investment (per unit),
E [z] < r () + (1  ) i; (21)
then for any t; t < 
, that is, the leverage that maximizes the expected rm relative value 't
is smaller than the leverage that minimizes the cost of capital w. The di¤erence    t > 0
21
is the equity cushion.
2. If E [z]  r ()+(1  ) i, then t = , that is, the rm minimizes the static cost
of capital.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
We show in Appendix A.7 that
'0t (t) =
D0 (t)
D (t)
't (t) + pD (t) (1 + i)'
0
t+1
 
yt+1 (t)
 @yt+1
@t
(t; i) : (22)
Equation (22) illustrates why minimizing the cost of capital cannot be optimal. If the rm
minimizes its cost of capital, i.e., sets t = 
, the rst term in Equation (22) is equal to
zero. However, if an investment opportunity arises at date t, the rm can no longer optimize
its capital structure at (t+ 1), and selects yt+1 (t) > t+1, which reduces the continuing
value of the rm:
'0t (
) = pD () (1 + i)'0t+1
 
yt+1 (
)
 @yt+1
@t
(; i) < 0:
The rm therefore maintains an equity cushion to protect against that occurrence.
The estimated values of the parameters are such that Inequality (21) holds. Hence
t < 
 for all t  T : in order to maximize value, the rm does not minimize the cost
of capital, i.e., does not exhaust the benets of the tax shield. The rm pays the static
cost  = w
 
t
   w () > 0 to protect nancial exibility.  can be interpreted as an
insurance cost, or the cost of nancial exibility. This result is consistent with Rochet and
Villeneuve (2011) and Bolton et al. (2009), who nd that rms optimally hold cash reserves:
they accept to pay the opportunity cost of holding these reserves in order to protect their
nancial exibility.
This result complements the common wisdom found in the practitionersliterature. First,
it conrms that the optimal capital structure is not simply the one that minimizes the cost of
capital, as was sometimes incorrectly argued (for example Cohen (2003)). Second, it renes
qualitative insights. For example, Pettit (2007) argues (pp. 154-155) that the optimal capital
structure depends on the growth prospect of the rm: a high growth rm, e.g., a tech rm,
needs lower leverage than a mature, low-growth rm.
This result is consistent with Graham (2000)s observation that rms do not exhaust
the tax advantages of debt. One striking nding in Grahams study is that even protable,
large (hence diversied), liquid rms with low ex ante distress cost use debt conservatively,
as long as they have growth options. This model explains that observation: condition (21)
does not depend on the size of the rm, nor on the volatility of returns. So, for equally
protable rms, the main driver of debt conservativeness is the magnitude of the anticipated
investment opportunity, consistent with Graham (2000).
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For equally protable rms, the main driver of debt conservativeness is the magnitude
of the anticipated investment opportunity, consistent with Graham (2000).
Condition (21) is reversed if E [z] is much higher and/or i much smaller: highly protable
rms with small investment opportunities do not maintain an equity cushion, rather minimize
static cost of capital.
5 Robustness of the results
5.1 Higher volatility
As previously mentioned, we use the volatility of the actual ROICs, which are post risk
management activities by the rms, to estimate of the volatility of zt+1. Therefore, we
probably underestimate the true underlying volatility. To correct for this bias, we double
the volatility of ROIC.
As presented on Figure 4, the results are almost unchanged. For t < 
(4)
t , the rm
optimally hedges fully, hence the underlying volatility does not matter. For t > 
(4)
t , the
rms expected relative value Jt is higher when the volatility is higher. This is a consequence
of the gambling for resurrection: the probability of achieving leverage lower than b, hence
the value of the unhedged rm, increases with the underlying volatility.
[Insert Figure 4]
5.2 No Hedging
Suppose now that for an exogenous reason, the rms does not hedge, i.e., set t = 0. We
have veried empirically that the shape of value function and the optimal investment and
dividend payments strategies are qualitatively unchanged for t = 
 and t = 0. The
intuition is as follows: the logic applied to t+1 = yt+1, next periods leverage when rms
hedge, applies to yt+1; the expected next period leverage when rms do not hedge, as long
as truncation is not an issue.
The leverage thresholds, however, are slightly lower, as illustrated on Table 5. Compari-
son of (1)t in Table 5 shows that the presence of hedging allows the rms to pay dividends for
higher leverage. Similarly, hedging implies that full investment remains optimal for higher
leverage (see (2)t ) and that the rm continues to invest at higher leverage (see 
(3)
t ).
The rms optimal leverage ratio t is higher, or equivalently, the precautionary savings
is lower by about 2%, when hedging is allowed. This translates into higher relative rm
value: the average "hedging premium", dened as
Jt (t; it)t=   Jt (t; it)t=0
Jt (t; it)t=0
;
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Table 5: investment and dividends thresholds in the no hedging case
Leverage thresholds (%) t ^t 
(1)
t (i) 
(1)
t (0) 
(2)
t (i) 
(2)
t (0) 
(3)
t
Hedging 31 40 27 36 37 45 51
No hedging 29 37 25 35 33 42 48
In both cases, the parameters are as in Tables 2, 3 and 4. Critical values are for a selected t "far
enough" from the last period T that the value function is numerically stationary, that is,
Jt   Jt+1 =
maxit

maxt
Jt (t; it)  Jt+1(t; it)  10 4. This criterion translates into (T   t) = 20. The cost of
capital w () is minimized at  = 31:7%:
is 7:1% if an investment opportunity is present, 6:7% otherwise, and the maximum premium
is 12%. As the optimization of Equations (11a) and (11b) is performed over less control
variables, the relative rm value in the no hedging case is smaller or equal to the rm value
when hedging is permitted.
Finally, since the optimal leverage ratio is higher, Equation (20) indicates that dividends
are also higher when the rm is allowed to hedge.
This analysis suggests that rms hedge to take advantage of the tax shield from debt, not
of the convexity of the tax schedule, as was suggested for example by Smith and Stulz (1985).
This conrms the widely held view among practitioners that "hedging is tax advantaged
equity". This observation is conrmed empirically by Graham and Rogers (2002): rms
hedge to increase their leverage, hence the tax shield, hence their value. On their sample,
hedging rms increase leverage by 3%, and value by 1:1%. The magnitude of the "hedging
premium" is also consistent with Allayanis and Weston (2001), who estimate that hedging
rmsaverage Tobins q is 5:7% higher than non hedging rms. Since we do not include
hedging cost, our estimate is higher than theirs. Taking this e¤ect into account, our model
is remarkably close to reality. The value we obtain is larger than Bolton et al. (2011), who
nd only a 1% increase in value arising from hedging. Two reasons explain this di¤erence:
rst, taxes are included in our analysis. Hedging enables the rm to increase leverage, hence
capture tax savings, an e¤ect not included in Bolton et al. (2011). Second, we exclude
hedging costs.
5.3 Changes in the models specication
5.3.1 Value function concave with a unique maximum in leverage for t  b
Most of the results hinge on Jt (t; it) being concave with a unique maximum for 0  t 
b < 1. In our model, this is caused by the convexity of the the expected return required by
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investors, i.e., it is produced by the denominator of the relative rm value. We believe this
e¤ect is robust to di¤erent specications that incorporate nancial frictions in the numerator
of the rm value.
Consider rst the impact of the tax shield. Suppose for example the tax shield is included
in the numerator of the value function as opposed to its denominator, an approach known
as the Adjusted Present Value. While there is no consensus on the appropriate discount
rate for the tax shield (Welch (2008), pp. 504-507), all agree that the value of the tax shield,
hence the value of the rm, increases with the leverage.
Multiple models can then justify why the value function that decreases with leverage.
The rst example is the inclusion of business disruption costs, developed by Leland (1994)
and Leland and Toft (1996). Combined with the tax-shield e¤ect, it produces a value function
concave in leverage with a unique maximum.
The following heuristic argument justies why micro-founded models also produce con-
cave value functions. As mentioned in the introduction, a series of articles derive the dy-
namically optimal nancial contracts resolving the underlying repeated moral-hazard prob-
lem between managers/insiders and investors/outsiders, and explore their implementation
through standard securities (Biais et al. (2011) develop a synthetic model and review the
litterature). Biais et al. (2007) introduce cash reserve as a state variable, since the limited
liability constraints of the manager/insider and nancier/outsider impose that negative op-
erating cash ow cannot be nanced by the agents. In our model, we allow intermediate
renancing: when the rms free cash ow is negative, it can borrow to nance the shortfall.
Hence, the cash reserve in Biais et al. (2007) is replaced in our model by the borrowing
capacity (1  ), held outside of the rm, not inside.
Biais et al. (2007) show that the market-to-book ratio of equity is a concave function of
cash reserves, with a unique maximum7. Furthermore, the market value of stocks and debt
goes to zero when the cash reserve goes to zero: the rm has to be liquidated to maintain
incentive compatibility. With our re-interpretation as (1  ) being equivalent to the cash
reserve, this translates into the market-to-book ratio being a concave function of , with a
unique maximum, and Jt (1; it) = 0.
5.3.2 Equity issuance and asset sales
We expect including these possibilities would not signicantly alter the optimal strategy,
rather would create an upper bound on feasible leverage.
Consider rst equity issuance. As is well documented (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (2003)),
equity issuance is associated with a signicant reduction in share value, most likely due to
signalling e¤ect. The rm would then issue equity if and only if this loss is compensated
by a relative value increase due to lower leverage. Given the shape of the value function,
7Biais et al. (2007) prove that the book-to-market ratio of equity is a U shaped function of cash reserves,
which is equivalent.
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this would likely mean that the rm issues equity if and only if leverage exceeds a given
threshold.
The same argument applies to asset sales. If the external asset price is higher than the
internal value, the rm sells assets. This is simply arbitrage. The more relevant case is when
the external asset price is lower than the internal value. The rm would sell assets and
use the proceeds to retire debt if and only if the value loss is compensated by a relative
value increase due to lower leverage. Given the shape of the value function, this would again
translate into a maximum leverage decision rule.
5.3.3 Hedging technology
Our analysis assumes that the rm can (i) hedge all its exposure, and (ii) do so costlessly.
(i) is of course not met in practice: no rm can hedge all of its risk. Even if an oil company
fully hedges its oil price risk, its operational risk remains. (ii) is not as irrealistic as it seems.
Transaction fees, the variable costs of hedging, are small and not essential to the decision
of large industrial rms. In general, these do not buy and sell derivatives repeatedly, hence
pay transaction fees only once. The collateral rms are required to post when hedging, that
is included for example in Bolton et al. (2011), constitutes an important cost not included
here. Finally, the xed costs of hedging are signicant: hiring of the traders, systems, control,
accounting, etc. However, these do not depend on the transaction volume, so they have a
limited impact on the hedging ratio, once the decision to set up a hedging group has been
made.
The analysis of the no hedging case yields some preliminary insights into the optimal
solution in a more general hedging environment, where (i) the rm is able to hedge only a
portion of its underlying risk, and (ii) hedging is costly. We expect the rms risk management
strategy will remain qualitatively unchanged, even though the critical values will change.
First, the no hedging case shows that the structure of the dividend/investment strategy is
unchanged. Second, the hedging strategy will be altered. The optimal hedging ratio balances
the marginal cost of hedging against its marginal benet. The latter arises from the concavity
of the objective function, hence hedging will be more valuable as the function becomes more
concave. If we assume that the main variable cost is the cost of collateral that need to
be posted, the cost should be very low for rms with low leverage (a highly rated rm is
required to post less collateral), and increase as rms become more levered. Including costs
should marginally reduce the hedging ratio for low-leverage rms, and progressively reduce
the optimal hedging ratio as rms are more levered. It will lead to gambling for resurrection
earlier, as in Rochet and Villeneuve (2011).
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6 Concluding remarks
This paper develops a dynamic model to determine a rms optimal risk management strat-
egy in the presence of two nancial frictions: tax deductibility of interest payments and
information asymmetry between managers/insiders and investors/outsiders. These frictions
are incorporated through the required rate of return, assumed to be a convex function of
leverage. The risk management strategy has two elements: rst, the rm manages its capital
structure through dividend distributions and investment. When leverage is very low, the rm
fully replaces depreciated assets, fully invests in opportunities if they arise, and distribute
dividends to reach its optimal capital structure. As leverage increases, the rm stops paying
dividends, while fully investing. After a certain leverage, the rm also reduces investment,
until it stop investing completely. Second, until leverage is very high, the rm fully hedges
its operating cash ow exposure, due to the convexity in its cost of capital. When leverage
exceeds a very high threshold, around 74% with the parameters we have estimated, the rm
gambles for resurrection. The model predictions are consistent with empirical observations.
This analysis can be enriched by several additions. First, a more complex capital struc-
ture, including equity issuance could be examined. Currently, nancing needs are met by
debt issuance, and excess cash is used to pay down debt, until all debt is repaid. Similarly,
sale of assets as a means to reduce leverage could be introduced.
Second, we would like to examine richer hedging environment. Multiple risk factors, not
all hedgeable, could be included. Except for commodity producers, very few rms face a
single risk factor. Determining the overall hedging strategy and, in particular, the trade-o¤s
between hedging the di¤erent risks would be very valuable. Similarly, non-linear hedging
strategies could be examined. Senior managers and Boards are often reluctant to hedge their
risk using forward contracts, as it deprives them of the potential upside, should the output
price go up (or the input price go down). Investing in options might prove more acceptable
to them, if the value was clearly identied.
Third, we would like to introduce cash reserves as another state variable. In this model,
rms are assumed to always be able to nance themselves on external markets, albeit at an
increasing cost. Holding cash reserves would enable rms to lower the debt increase required
to nance their investment.
These extensions would render the analysis closer to the reality and choices faced by
rms, hence would provide clear and practical guidance as rms strive to dene their risk
management strategy.
Finally, we would like to rene the empirical analysis by testing the predictions of these
richer models on rms of varying characteristics (e.g., growth rate and intrinsic volatility).
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A Proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3
The rst-order conditions are derived in Appendix A.1. The induction hypotheses on the
shape of 't+1 are formally dened in Appendix A.2. The optimal controls, given the induction
hypotheses, are derived in Appendices A.3 and A.4. The induction hypotheses for 't are
derived in Appendices A.5 and A.6. The equity cushion is derived in Appendix A.7.
A.1 The rst order conditions
To optimize the rm relative value, the partial derivatives of Equation (12) with respect to
each of the control variables are required. Assuming the independence between zt+1 and
it+1,
@
@dt
(t; gt; dt; t) = D (t) Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(t+1; it+1)

(23)
 D (t) Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1)

 ( Bt) ;
@
@gt
(t; gt; dt; t) = D (t)

Et

Jt+1 (t+1; it+1)
  1 + Et (1  t+1) @Jt+1
@t+1
(t+1; it+1)

(24)
 D (t) Et

@Jt+1
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(0; it+1)

 ( Bt) ;
@
@t
(t; gt; dt; t 6= 1) =  D (t)
1 + gt   
1  t
Et

(t+1   yt+1)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(t+1; it+1)

(25)
 D (t) 1 + gt   
1  t
yt+1Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1)

 ( Bt) ;
@
@t
(t; gt; dt; t = 1) = 0 if 0 < yt+1 < 1; (26)
where  represents the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random vari-
able and Bt (yt+1; gt; dt; t) = yt+1 (t; gt; dt)
1+gt 
Z(1 t) .
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Sketch of the proof8. Conditional on the available information at time t; t+1 is a
truncated Gaussian random variable, that is 0  t+1  1 if and only if At (t; dt; t) 
"t+1  Bt (t; gt; dt; t) where
At (yt+1; gt; dt; t) =
 (t) + dt   1  E [z]
Z (1  t)
= (yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  1) 1 + gt   
Z (1  t)
;
and Bt (yt+1; gt; dt; t) =
 (t) + gt    + dt   E [z]
Z (1  t)
= yt+1 (t; gt; dt)
1 + gt   
Z (1  t)
:
Expressing the conditional expectation as an integral,
Et

Jt+1 (t+1; it+1)

= Et
"Z At(gt;dt;t)
 1
Jt+1 (1; it+1) 
0 (") d"
#
+Et
"Z Bt(gt;dt;t)
At(gt;dt;t)
Jt+1 (t + t"; it+1) 
0 (") d"
#
+ Et
Z 1
Bt(gt;dt;t)
Jt+1 (0; it+1) 
0 (") d"

where the bounds At and Bt as well as the conditional mean and standard deviation of t+1,
are functions of the control variables. Partial derivatives of Et

Jt+1 (t+1)

are obtained
from the application of Leibniz integration rule to each of the three integrals. 
In the following, we refer to the rst order conditions (FOC) the solution to @
@ut
(t; g

t ; d

t ; 

t ) =
0, ut being one of the three control variables.
A.2 Value function at time t+ 1
The induction hypothesis in broken in two parts:
Induction hypothesis 1 't+1 is concave on [0; bt+1).
Induction hypothesis 2 't+1
 
t+1

> 1 and 't+1


(4)
t+1

< 1.
The following mild technical assumption is required in the initiation of the recursion.
Assumption 3 Shape of the continuing value
1. w


(4)
T

> E [z].
2. JT+1 () is concave on [aT+1; bT+1] where 0  aT+1 <  < bT+1  bT+1  1:
8A detailed proof is available at Section C of the technical report.
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Point 1 is used at Appendix A.6. Intuitively, if the cost of capital is too low compared to
the expected ROIC, the rm has no incentive to control its indebtedness and invests as much
as it can. Consequently, we assume there exists a leverage above which the expected return
on investment is smaller than the cost of capital, that is w () > E [z] for all su¢ ciently large
. Point 2 starts the convexity recursion about the rms relative expected value.
Corollary 2 There is a unique bt+1 2 t+1; bt+1 such that t+1 > 0 on h0; bt+1, t+1 bt+1 =
0 and t+1 < 0 on
bt+1; bt+1i :
Proof. The function t+1 () = 't+1 ()   1 + (1  )'0t+1 () is decreasing on [0; bt+1].
Indeed, 't+1 being concave, '
00
t+1 < 0
0t+1 () = (1  )'00t+1 () < 0:
Moreover,

 
t+1

= '
 
t+1
  1 > 0;
t+1


(4)
t+1

= 't+1


(4)
t+1

  1 +

1  (4)t+1

'0t+1


(4)
t+1

< 't+1


(4)
t+1

  1 < 0;
where the last inequality is justied by Induction Hypothesis 2. Therefore,  () is positive
on

0; t+1

, remains positive for a while before it reaches 0 and becomes negative.
Verication of Induction Hypotheses 1 and 2 at time T is similar to the case t < T
presented in Appendices A.5 and A.6. Therefore, we refer to Appendix G of the technical
report for a detailed proof.
A.3 Investment and dividends policies in the full hedging case
given properties of value function at date (t+ 1)
See Section 4.1.
A.4 Hedging policy given properties of value function at date
(t+ 1)
Lemma 1 Let '00t+1 stands for the second derivative of 't+1, that is, '
00
t+1 (y) = Et
h
@2Jt+1
@2t+1
(y; it+1)
i
.
1. If '00t+1 (yt+1 ()) > 0 then the optimal hedging decision is 

t () = 0:
2. If '00t+1 (yt+1 ()) < 0 then the optimal hedging decision is 

t () = 1.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Equation (26) implies that full hedging always satises the rst
order condition. Equation (25) goes to zero as t !  1. As the hedging parameter is
constrainted to be positive, it is not an admissible solution. Hence, there will be some cases
where the optimal solution will stand on limit of the constraint t  0, that is t (t) = 0: To
determine whether the full hedging decision is optimal, we consider the second derivative9:
@2t
@2t
(t; gt; dt; t = 1) = D (t)
2Z
1 + gt   Et
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
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t+1 (yt+1 (t; gt; dt)) :
Since 1
1+w(t)
2Z
1+gt  > 0, the sign of '
00
t+1 determines the sign of
@2t
@2t
. If '00t+1 > 0, then
t = 1 minimizes  and cannot be the optimal control. Therefore, '
00
t+1 (yt+1) > 0 implies
that t (t) = 0. If '
00
t+1 (yt+1) < 0, then t (t) = 1 is a local maximum. As there is no other
root, it is the optimal decision. 
Lemma 2 The deterministic part of the next period leverage in the full hedging case,
yt+1 (t) =
 (t) + g

t (t)   + dt (t)  E [z]
1 + gt (t)  
;
is a continuous and non-decreasing function of t:
Proof. According to the optimal management policies of Proposition 1,
yt+1 (t) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
t if t 2
h
0; 
(1)
t (it)
i
(t)+it E[z]
1+it
if t 2


(1)
t (it) ; 
(2)
t (it)
i
bt+1 if t 2 (2)t (it) ; (3)t i
(t)  E[z]
1  if t 2


(3)
t ; 
(4)
t
i
(27)
Continuity arises from the denitions of (1)t (it), 
(2)
t (it) and 
(3)
t : Because  is an increasing
function, yt+1 is a non-decreasing function of t.
9Proof at Section E of the technical report.
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A.5 Verication of Induction Hypothesis 1 at time t (Concavity
of Jt over [0; bt])
Replacing the optimal control variables in Equation (12), the rm relative value at time t
becomes Jt (t; it) =8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
D (t)
 
E[z]  it + (1 + it)'t+1
 
t+1

if t 2
h
0; 
(1)
t (it)
i
D (t)

E[z]  it + (1 + it)'t+1

(t)+it E[z]
1+it

if t 2


(1)
t (it) ; 
(2)
t (it)
i
D (t)

E[z] +

't+1
bt+1  1 E[z]+bt+1 (t)
1 bt+1 + 't+1
bt+1 if t 2 (2)t (it) ; (3)t i
D (t)

E[z] +  + (1  )'t+1

(t)  E[z]
1 

if t 2


(3)
t ; 
(4)
t
i
(28)
For t 2
h
0; 
(1)
t (it)
i
, Jt (t; it) = D (t)
 
E[z]  it + (1 + it)'t+1
 
t+1

which is
concave on
h
0; 
(1)
t (it)
i
because the discount factor is.
For t 2


(1)
t (it) ; 
(2)
t (it)
i
, the concavity is veried by looking at the second derivative
of Jt which must be negative. Equation (28) leads to
@2Jt
@2t
(t; it) =
D00 (t)
D (t)
Jt (t; it) + (2D
0 (t)0 (t) +D (t)00 (t))'0t+1
 
yt+1 (t)

+D (t)'
00
t+1
 
yt+1 (t)
 (0 (t))2
1 + it
:
D00 < 0 by Assumption 1 making the rst term negative. t 2 ((1)t (it) ; (2)t (it)] implies
that t+1  yt+1 (t)  bt+1. Therefore, '0t+1  yt+1 (t) < 0. Consequently, the second
term is negative provided that 2D00 +D00 > 0: (D)00 = D00+ 2D00 +D00 implies that
2D00 + D00 = (D)00   D00 > 0 by Assumption 1. Induction Hypothesis 1 implies that
'00t+1
 
yt+1 (t)

< 0, therefore, the third term is negative.
Consider t 2 ((2)t (it) ; (3)t ]: First, note that 't+1(bt+1) > 1. Indeed,
0 = t+1
bt+1 = 't+1 bt+1  1 + 1  bt+1'0t+1 bt+1 < 't+1 bt+1  1
where the last inequality holds because bt+1 > t+1 implies that 't+1 is decreasing at bt+1:
Second, the concavity is obtained by means of the second derivative. Indeed, applying the
derivative operator to Equation (28) leads to
@2Jt
@2t
(t; it) =
D00 (t)
D (t)
Jt (t; it)  (2D0 (t)0 (t) +D (t)00 (t))
't+1
bt+1  1
1  bt+1 :
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D00 < 0 implies the rst term is negative. Since 't+1(bt+1) > 1, then 't+1(bt+1) 11 bt+1 is positive.
2D00 +D00 = (D)00  D00 > 0 by Assumption 1.
Finally, let t 2 ((3)t ; (4)t ]: As there is no investment, the value function remains the same
whenever an investment opportunity is present or not, that is to say, Jt (t; i) = J

t (t; 0) :
@2Jt
@2t
(t) =
D00 (t)
D (t)
Jt (t) + (2D
0 (t)0 (t) +D (t)00 (t))'0t+1
 
yt+1 (t)

+D (t)
0 (t)'00t+1
 
yt+1 (t)

:
t 2 ((3)t ; (4)t ] implies that yt+1 (t) = (t)  E[z]1  > bt+1. Hence, '0t+1  yt+1 (t) < 0.
D00 < 0 implies that the rst term of @
2Jt
@2t
is negative. The second term is negative since
2D00 +D00 = (D)00 D00 > 0 by Assumption 1. Finally, Induction Hypothesis 1 implies
that 't+1 is concave on [0; bt+1]. Hence '
00
t+1
 
yt+1 (t)

and, consequently, the third term are
negative for yt+1 (t) =
(t)  E[z]
1   bt+1, that is, for t  (4)t .
Since the rst two terms are negative and the third equal to zero, @
2Jt
@2t


(4)
t

< 0 hence
@2Jt
@2t
< 0 on ((3)t ; 
(4)
t ]. Then 
(4)
t  bt dened by '00t (bt) = 0.
A.6 Verication of the Induction Hypothesis 2 at time t
A.6.1 't
 
t
  1
We will show that on [0; (3)t ], D
 1 (t) Jt (t; it)  1+E[z]. Hence, since  2 [0; (3)t ], then
Jt (
; it)  1+E[z]1+w() > 1: Therefore,
't
 
t
  't () = Jt (; i) p+ Jt (; 0) (1  p)  1:
On [0; (1)t (it)], the Induction Hypothesis 2 implies that 't+1
 
t+1

> 1: Therefore,
starting from Equation (28),
D 1 (t) Jt (t; it) = E[z]  it + (1 + it)'t+1
 
t+1
  E[z] + 1:
Because t 2 ((1)t (it) ; (2)t (it)] implies that t+1  t+1 (t)  bt+1, then
't+1
 
t+1 (t)
  't+1 t+1 (2)t (it) = 't+1 bt+1 > 1:
Therefore, Equation (28) leads to
D 1 (t) Jt (t; it) = E[z]  it + (1 + it)'t+1
 
t+1 (t)
  E[z] + 1:
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On the interval t 2 ((2)t (it) ; (3)t ],
E [z] + bt+1    (t)
1  bt+1 
E [z] + bt+1   (3)t 
1  bt+1 =  
Therefore, starting from Equation (28),
D 1 (t) Jt (t; it) = E[z] +

't+1
bt+1  1 E [z] + bt+1    (t)
1  bt+1 + 't+1
bt+1
 E[z]  

't+1
bt+1  1+ 't+1 bt+1
= E[z] +  + (1  )'t+1
bt+1
 E[z] +  + (1  )
= E[z] + 1: 
A.6.2 't


(4)
t

< 1
Lemma 3 For all t  T;
bt+1  (4)t  bt  b
Proof of Lemma 3. As we have seen from the analysis of the concavity of Jt (t; it),

(4)
t  bt: We claim that (4)t  b. Indeed, because b is the xed point of yt+1 (b) = b,
yt+1 (t)  t , t  b. It implies that if t > b, then yt+1 (t) > t, hence the fully-hedging
rm becomes bankrupt with probability one. Therefore, it cannot be optimal for the rm to
fully hedge for t > b; implying that 
(4)
t  b. From this last inequality,
bt+1 = y

t+1


(4)
t

 (4)t  bt
and this is veried for all t  T .
Lemma 3 implies that 4t+1  bt+1 = yt+1


(4)
t

: Since 't+1 is decreasing on the right of
t+1, then 't+1

yt+1


(4)
t

 't+1


(4)
t+1

: Hence,
't


(4)
t

= D


(4)
t

E[z]   + (1  )'t+1

yt+1


(4)
t

(Equation 28)
 D


(4)
t

E[z]   + (1  )'t+1


(4)
t+1

 D


(4)
t

(E[z]   + (1  )) (Induction Hypothesis 2)
 1 + E[z]
1 + w


(4)
t

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which is strictly smaller than one provided that w


(4)
t

> E[z]: But w being increasing
to the right of t+1, w


(4)
t

 w


(4)
T

 E[z] where the last inequality comes from
Assumption 3.
A.7 Equity cushion
The proof proceeds in four steps. First, it is shown that if 1t (i) < 
, then 1t (i) < t < 
.
Second, backward induction is used to show that if 1T (i) < 
, then 1t (i) < 
 for all t.
Third, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for 1T (i) < 
 is given, ending the induction.
The fourth step examines the case 1T (i)  .
Part I. Suppose (1)t (i) < 
  (1)t (0) and consider t 2


(1)
t (i) ; 

i
. Because t <

(4)
t , full hedging is optimal. If it = 0, then g
 (t; it) =  and the optimal dividend rate is
chosen such that yt+1 (t; gt ; d

t ) = t+1. If it = i, then d
 (t; it) = 0 and the investment is
chosen such that yt+1 (t; i) = yt+1 (t; g

t ; d

t ) > t+1. Therefore
't (t) = J

t+1
 
yt+1 (t; i) ; i

p+ Jt+1
 
t+1; 0

(1  p)
= D (t)
 
E[z]  i+ (1 + i)'t+1
 
yt+1 (t)

p+D (t)
 
E[z] + 't+1
 
t+1

(1  p)
and
'0t (t) =
D0 (t)
D (t)
't (t) +D (t) (1 + i)'
0
t+1
 
yt+1 (t)
 @yt+1
@t
(t; i) p:
'0t


(1)
t (i)

> 0 since (i) yt+1


(1)
t (i)

= t+1; (ii) '0t+1
 
t+1

= 0 and (iii) D0 (t) > 0, t
being smaller that : Moreover, since D0 () = 0;
'0t (
) = D () (1 + i)'0t+1
 
yt+1 (
)
 @yt+1
@t
(; i) p
which is negative because
@yt+1
@t
> 0 and yt+1 (
)  t+1 implies that '0t+1
 
yt+1 (
)
  0:
By continuity of '0t, since '
0
t


(1)
t (i)

> 0 and '0t (
)  0, there is t 2


(1)
t (i) ; 

i
such
that '0t
 
t

= 0:
Part II. Assume that (1)T (i) < 
: A backward induction argument is used to show that

(1)
t (i) < 
: Indeed, from Part I, if (1)t+1 (i) < 
, then t+1 2


(1)
t+1 (i) ; 

i
: Therefore,
because 


(1)
t (it)

= E [z] + t+1  
 
1  t+1

it



(1)
T (i)

  


(1)
t (i)

=
 
   t+1

(1 + i) > 0:
Hence, as  is an increasing function, (1)t (i) < 
(1)
T (i)  :
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Part III. (1)T (i) < 
 if and only if
0 <  ()  


(1)
T (i)

=  (1 + r ())  E [z]   + (1  ) i
= r ()  E [z] + (1  ) i
that is, the expected ROIC is lower than interest payments (per unit) and the equity fraction
of the investment (per unit):
E [z] < r () + (1  ) i:
Part IV. What happens if (1)T (i)  ? One can show by induction that t =  for
any t: Indeed, if t+1 = 
, then



(1)
T (i)

  


(1)
t (i)

=
 
   t+1

(1 + i) = 0;
implying that (1)t (i) = 
(1)
T (i)  . But, for any t    (1)t (i) ;
't (t) = D (t)
 
E[z]  i+ (1 + i)'t+1
 
t+1

p+D (t)
 
E[z] + 't+1
 
t+1

(1  p)
and
'0t (t) = D
0 (t)
 
E[z]  i+ (1 + i)'t+1
 
t+1

p+D0 (t)
 
E[z] + 't+1
 
t+1

(1  p) :
Because D0 () = 0, '0t (
) = 0 and 't (t) is maximized at 
, that is t = 
: 
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Figure 1: Cost of capital vs. Leverage
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This gure presents the cost of capital as a function of the rms leverage (Equation (17)). The parameters
presented in Table 3 are obtained from a sample of 340 rms during the period of 1995 to 2003.
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Figure 2: Firms Relative Value and Optimal Policies Multi-period Model
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This gure shows the optimal relative value JT (top left gure), the optimal policy for the investment level
gT (top right gure), the optimal policy for the hedging ratio T (bottom left gure), the optimal dividend
payout dT (bottom right gure) as a function of leverage. The dotted line represents the case with no
investment opportunity in the decision period (iT = 0), while the continuous line represents the case when
the investment opportunity is present (iT = 14:7%) : The optimal policies and relative value are computed
with the numerical implementation described in Appendix H of the technical report. The cost of capital is
minimized at  = 31:6%. The magnitude of the investment opportunity is equal to 12:6%, which arrives
during a period with a probability of 21:2%. The expected ROIC is E [z] = 8:4% with standard deviation
 = 5:8 /% (Table 1).
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Figure 3: Expected Leverage Ratio for t+1 Multi-Period Model
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This gure shows the expected leverage at time t+1 as a function of the leverage ratio at time t: The dotted
line represents the case with no investment opportunity in the decision period (iT = 0), while the continuous
line represents the case when the investment opportunity is present (iT = 12:6%) : The expected leverage is
computed with equation (41) and the associated optimal values for T , dT , and gT . The cost of capital is
minimized at t = 31:6%. The magnitude of the investment opportunity is equal to 12:6%, which arrives
during a period with a probability of 21:2%. The expected value and standard deviation of the source of
uncertainty z is 8% and 10% respectively. The straight line is the curve f () = :
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Figure 4: Firm relative values in a high volatility framework
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The continuous line represents the relative value of the rm for the base case where all parameters are as
in Tables 2, 3 and 4. The dashed line corresponds to the rm relative value when the underlying source of
uncertainty () is doubled to 11.6%, all other parameters being for the base case.
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B Derivation of the Bellman equations
This section deduces the Bellman equations (11a) and (11b): For t = 0; :::; T 1, let Jt (t; it)
be the optimal value for the T   t stage problem that starts at date t in state (t; it) ; as
dened in Equation (10) : First, consider the case for t = T: Using the continuation value
obtained in (8) ;
JT (T ; iT ) = max
gT ;T ;dT
s:t: (1); (2); (3); (5)
ET
" 1X
s=T+1
 
sY
k=T+1
D (k 1)
!
(xs   gs 1 + )
 
s 2Y
u=T
(1 + gu   )
!#
= max
gT ;T ;dT
s:t: (1); (2); (3); (5)
D (T ) ET

xT+1   gT +  + (1 + gT   ) E [z]  g + 
w(T+1)  g + 

;
which leads to Equation (11a) : Now, from Equation (10) ; the problem at t can be written
as
Jt (t; it) = maxfgs;s;dsgst
s:t: (1); (2); (3); (5)
Et
" 1X
s=t+1
 
sY
k=t+1
D (k 1)
!
(xs   gs 1 + )
 
s 2Y
u=t
(1 + gu   )
!#
= max
fgs;s;dsgst
s:t: (1); (2); (3); (5)
D (t) Et [xt+1   gt + 
+ (1 + gt   )
1X
s=t+2
 
sY
k=t+2
D (k 1)
!
(xs   gs 1 + )
 
s 2Y
u=t+1
(1 + gu   )
!#
:
Let (gu; 

u; d

u)
T
u=t+1 be an optimal policy for the subproblem J

t+1 (t+1; it+1) that starts at
date t+ 1 and has nal decision at stage T: Then
Jt (t; it) = max
gt;t;dt
s:t: (2);(1); and (3)
D (t) Et

(xt+1   gt + ) + (1 + gt   ) Jt+1 (t+1; it+1)

which is Equation (11b) :
C Proofs of the rst order conditions (cf. Section A.1)
This Appendix provides detailed proofs of some results stated in Section A.1. Let
	(t; gt; dt; t) = Et

Jt+1 (t+1 (t; gt; dt; t) ; it+1)

:
Because 0  t+1  1 if and only if At (t; dt; t)  "t+1  Bt (t; gt; dt; t), we dene
e"t+1 = At1"t+1At + "t+11At<"t+1<Bt +Bt1"t+1At
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and note that
t+1 = yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt   e"t+1:
The following lemma computes the conditional expectation of the next period rms relative value, taking
care of the truncation e¤ect.
Lemma 4 If "t+1 and it+1 are independent,
	(t; gt; dt; t) = Et

Jt+1 (1; it+1)  (At (t; dt; t))

+Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
Jt+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
+Et

Jt+1 (0; it+1) (1   (Bt (t; gt; dt; t)))

:
Proof of Lemma 4. The expected relative rm value is
	(t; gt; dt; t) = Et

Jt+1 (t+1; it+1)

= Et

Jt+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt   e"t+1; it+1

= Et

Et

Jt+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt   
e"t+1
Z
; it+1
 it+1 :
Assuming that "t+1 and it+1 are independent, the inner conditional expectation becomesZ At(t;dt;t)
 1
Jt+1 (1; it+1) 
0 (") d"
+
Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
Jt+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
+
Z 1
Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
Jt+1 (0; it+1) 
0 (") d"
= Jt+1 (1; it+1)  (At) +
Z Bt
At
Jt+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
+Jt+1 (0; it+1) (1  0 (Bt))
where  is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable and 0 is its density
function. This completes the proof. 
The following lemmas compute the partial rst derivatives of t+1 with respect to each control variables.
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Lemma 5
@t+1
@t
(t; gt; dt; t) =
0 (t)
1 + gt    ;
@t+1
@gt
(t; gt; dt; t) =
1  t+1 (t; gt; dt; t)
1 + gt    ;
@t+1
@dt
(t; gt; dt; t) =
1
1 + gt    ;
@t+1
@t
(t; gt; dt; t) =
Z
1 + gt    "t+1
=
(
yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  t+1 (t; gt; dt; t) if t = 1
yt+1(t;gt;dt) t+1(t;gt;dt;t)
1 t if t < 1
Proof. Straight application starting from the denition of t+1:
Lemma 6 If t 6= 1 then
@	
@t
(t; gt; dt; t) = Et

yt+1   t+1
1  t
@Jt+1
@t+1
(t+1; it+1)

 yt+1   1
1  t
Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(1; it+1)

 (At)  yt+1
1  t
Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1)

(1   (Bt)) :
If 0 < yt+1 (t; gt; dt) < 1, then @	@t (t; gt; dt; t = 1) = 0:
Proof of Lemma 6. Starting using Lemma 4,
@	
@t
(t; gt; dt; t) =
@
@t
Et

Jt+1 (1; it+1)  (At (t; dt; t))

+
@
@t
Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
Jt+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
+
@
@t
Et

Jt+1 (0; it+1) (1   (Bt (t; gt; dt; t)))

= Et

Jt+1 (1; it+1)
@
@t
 (At (t; dt; t))

+Et
"
@
@t
Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
Jt+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
+Et

Jt+1 (0; it+1)
@
@t
(1   (Bt (t; gt; dt; t)))

where the derivative can be introduced inside the integral using the bounded convergence theorem. Using
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Leibniz integral rule10 ,
@	
@t
(t; gt; dt; t)
= Et

Jt+1 (1; it+1) 
0 (At (t; dt; t))
@At
@t
(t; dt; t)

+Et

@Bt
@t
(t; gt; dt; t) J

t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt   Bt (t; gt; dt; t) ; it+1

0 (Bt (t; gt; dt; t))

 Et

@At
@t
(t; dt; t) J

t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt   At (t; dt; t) ; it+1

0 (At (t; dt; t))

+Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
@Jt+1
@t

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
 Et

Jt+1 (0; it+1)
0 (Bt (t; gt; dt; t))
@Bt
@t
(t; gt; dt; t)

= Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
@Jt+1
@t

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
= Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
@t+1
@t
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
(chain rule)
= Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
Z
1 + gt    "
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
(Lemma 5)
= Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
Z
1 + gt    "
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
+Et
"Z At(t;dt;t)
 1
Z
1 + gt   At (t; dt; t)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(1; it+1)
0 (") d"
#
+Et
"Z 1
Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
Z
1 + gt   Bt (t; gt; dt; t)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1) 
0 (") d"
#
 Et

Z
1 + gt   At (t; dt; t)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(1; it+1)  (At (t; dt; t))

 Et

Z
1 + gt   Bt (t; gt; dt; t)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1) (1   (Bt (t; gt; dt; t)))

:
Since t+1 = yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1 t1+gt e"t+1, then if t 6= 1,
Z
1 + gt   e"t+1 = yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  t+11  t :
10 d
d
R b()
a()
f (x; ) dx = dbd () f (b () ; )  dad () f (a () ; ) +
R b()
a()
@f
@ (x; ) dx
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Therefore, if t 6= 1 , then
@	
@t
(t; gt; dt; t) = Et

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  t+1 (t; gt; dt; t)
1  t
@Jt+1
@t+1
(t+1 (t; gt; dt; t) ; it+1)

 yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  1
1  t
Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(1; it+1)

 (At (t; dt; t))
 yt+1 (t; gt; dt)
1  t
Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1)

(1   (Bt (t; gt; dt; t))) :
If t = 1 and 0 < yt+1 (t; gt; dt) < 1, then
@	
@t
(t; gt; dt; t = 1) = Et
Z 1
 1
Z
1 + gt    "
@Jt+1
@t+1
(yt+1 (t; gt; dt) ; it+1) 
0 (") d"

=
Z
1 + gt   
@Jt+1
@t+1
(yt+1 (t; gt; dt) ; it+1) Et
Z 1
 1
"0 (") d"

= 0:
Therefore, t = 1 is one root of
@	
@t
(t; gt; dt; t) : 
Lemma 7
@	
@dt
(t; gt; dt; t) =
1
1 + gt   Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(t+1 (t; gt; dt; t) ; it+1)

  1
1 + gt   

Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(1; it+1)

 (At (t; dt; t)) + Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1)

(1   (Bt (t; gt; dt; t)))

:
Proof of Lemma 7. Using Lemma 4,
@
@dt
	(t; gt; dt; t) =
@
@dt
Et

Jt+1 (1; it+1) (At (t; dt; t))

+
@
@dt
Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
Jt+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
+
@
@dt
Et

Jt+1 (0; it+1) (1   (Bt (t; gt; dt; t)))

= Et

Jt+1 (1; it+1)
@
@dt
 (At (t; dt; t))

+Et
"
@
@dt
Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
Jt+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
+Et

Jt+1 (0; it+1)
@
@dt
(1   (Bt (t; gt; dt; t)))

where the derivative can be introduced inside the integral using the bounded convergence theorem. Using
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Leibniz integral rule11 ,
@
@dt
	(t; gt; dt; t)
= Et

Jt+1 (1; it+1) 
0 (At (t; dt; t))
@At
@dt
(t; dt; t)

+Et

@Bt
@dt
(t; gt; dt; t) J

t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt   Bt; it+1

0 (Bt)

 Et

@At
@dt
(t; dt; t) J

t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt   At; it+1

0 (At)

+Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
@Jt+1
@dt

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
 Et

Jt+1 (0; it+1)
0 (Bt (t; gt; dt; t))
@Bt
@dt
(t; gt; dt; t)

= Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
@Jt+1
@dt

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
= Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
@t+1
@dt
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
(chain rule)
= Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
1
1 + gt   
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
(Lemma 5)
=
1
1 + gt   Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
=
1
1 + gt   Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(t+1 (t; gt; dt; t) ; it+1)

  1
1 + gt   Et
"Z At(t;dt;t)
 1
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt   At (t; dt; t) ; it+1

0 (") d"
#
  1
1 + gt   Et
"Z 1
Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt   Bt (t; gt; dt; t) ; it+1

0 (") d"
#
=
1
1 + gt   Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(t+1 (t; gt; dt; t) ; it+1)

  1
1 + gt   

Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(1; it+1)

 (At (t; dt; t)) + Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1)

(1   (Bt (t; gt; dt; t)))

: 
Lemma 8
@	
@gt
(t; gt; dt; t) =
1
1 + gt   

Et

(1  t+1)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(t+1; it+1)

  Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1)

0 ( Bt (t; gt; dt; t))

:
11 d
d
R b()
a()
f (x; ) dx = dbd () f (b () ; )  dad () f (a () ; ) +
R b()
a()
@f
@ (x; ) dx
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Proof of Lemma 8. Using similar arguments as for Lemma 7s proof,12
@
@gt
	(t; gt; dt; t)
= Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
@Jt+1
@gt

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
= Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
@t+1
@gt
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
(chain rule).
Using Lemma 5 and Denition (??),
@
@gt
	(t; gt; dt; t)
= Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
1  yt+1 (t; gt; dt) + Z 1 t1+gt  "
1 + gt   
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1   Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
+Et
"Z At(t;dt;t)
 1
1  yt+1 (t; gt; dt) + Z 1 t1+gt At
1 + gt   
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1   Z 1  t
1 + gt   At; it+1

0 (") d"
#
+Et
"Z 1
Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
1  yt+1 (t; gt; dt) + Z 1 t1+gt Bt
1 + gt   
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1   Z 1  t
1 + gt   Bt; it+1

0 (") d"
#
 Et

1  1
1 + gt   
@Jt+1
@t+1
(1; it+1)  (At (t; dt; t))

  Et

1  0
1 + gt   
@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1)

 ( Bt (t; gt; dt; t))
=
1
1 + gt   

Et

(1  t+1)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(t+1; it+1)

  Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1)

0 ( Bt (t; gt; dt; t))

: 
D Roots of Equation (25)
There is another root to Equation (25) provided that
Et

(t+1   yt+1)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(t+1; it+1)

=  yt+1Et

@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1)

 ( Bt) : (29)
The right hand side is negative and nil if the truncation e¤ect is negligible.
If t is large enough so that the truncation e¤ect is negligible, then  ( Bt) = 0, and the Condition (29)
becomes
Covt

t+1   yt+1;
@Jt+1
@t+1
(t+1; it+1)

= 0:
Since these two random variables are strongly dependent, one can show that this covariance cannot be nil
unless t = 1:
12 d
d
R b()
a()
f (x; ) dx = dbd () f (b () ; )  dad () f (a () ; ) +
R b()
a()
@f
@ (x; ) dx
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E Second derivative with respect to 
Lemma 9
@2	
@2t
(t; gt; dt; t = 1) =

Z
1 + gt   
2
Et
"
@2Jt+1
@2t+1
(yt+1 (t; gt; dt) ; it+1)
#
Proof of the lemma. Using the dominated convergence theorem to introduce the derivative operator
inside the expectation,
@2	
@2t
(t; gt; dt; t)
=
@
@t
Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
Z
1 + gt    "
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
= Et
"
@
@t
Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
Z
1 + gt    "
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
= Et

@Bt
@t
(t; t)
Z
1 + gt   Bt (t; t)
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt   Bt (t; t) ; it+1

0 (Bt (t; t))

 Et

@At
@t
(t; t)
Z
1 + gt   At (t; t)
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt   At (t; t) ; it+1

0 (At (t; t))

+Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)
@
@t
Z
1 + gt    "
@Jt+1
@t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
(Leibniz integral rule)
= Et

@Bt
@t
(t; t)
Z
1 + gt   Bt (t; t)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1) 
0 (Bt (t; t))

 Et

@At
@t
(t; t)
Z
1 + gt   At (t; t)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(1; it+1) 
0 (At (t; t))

+Et
"Z Bt(t;gt;dt;t)
At(t;dt;t)

Z
1 + gt    "
2 @2Jt+1
@2t+1

yt+1 (t; gt; dt)  Z 1  t
1 + gt    "; it+1

0 (") d"
#
(Chain rule)
If t = 1, then
@2	
@2t
(t; gt; dt; t = 1)
=

Z
1 + gt   
2
Et
"
@2Jt+1
@2t+1
(yt+1 (t; gt; dt) ; it+1)
Z 1
 1
"20 (") d"
#
=

Z
1 + gt   
2
Et
"
@2Jt+1
@2t+1
(yt+1 (t; gt; dt) ; it+1)
#
F Limit cases as ! 1
Lemma 10 If lim!1 w () =1 and lim!1 w
0()
(w())2
= 0; then for any t,
lim
!1
Jt () = 0 and lim
!1
@Jt
@t
() = 0:
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Proof of Lemma ??. The nal results are obtained noticing that
lim
T+1!1
JT+1 (T+1) = lim
T+1!1
E[z]  g + 
w(T+1)  g +  = 0
lim
T+1!1
@JT+1
@T+1
(T+1) = lim
T+1!1
 w0(T+1) E[z]  g + 
(w(T+1)  g + )2
= 0:
Using induction, since lim!1 t+1 () = 1 and lim!1D () = lim!1
1
1+w() = 0,
lim
!1
Jt () = lim
!1
t (g

t ; 

t ; d

t ;)
= lim
!1
D ()
 
E[z]  gt () +  + (1 + gt ()  )Et

Jt+1
 
t+1 () ; it+1

= 0:
For t > 
(3)
t , g

t () = 0 and d

t () = 0: Therefore,
@Jt
@t
() =
D0 ()
D ()
Jt () +D () (1  )Et

@Jt+1
@t
 
t+1 () ; it+1

:
But both D
0()
D() =   w
0()
1+w() and D () converges to 0 as ! 1: Consequently, @J

t
@t
()! 0 as ! 1
@Jt
@t
(t; it) = D
0 (t)
 
E[z] +  + (1  )Et

Jt+1
 
t+1 (t) ; it+1

+D (t) Et

0 (t)
@Jt+1
@t+1
 
t+1 (t; it) ; it+1

 D (t) Et

0 (t)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(1; it+1)  (A
 (t))

 D (t) Et

0 (t)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1)
0 ( B (t; it))

:
Consequently
lim
t!1
@Jt
@t
(t; it)
= lim
t!1
D0 (t)
 
E[z] +  + (1  )Et

Jt+1
 
t+1 (t) ; it+1

+ lim
t!1
D (t) Et

0 (t)
@Jt+1
@t+1
 
t+1 (t; it) ; it+1

  lim
t!1
D (t) Et

0 (t)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(1; it+1)  (A
 (t))

  lim
t!1
D (t) Et

0 (t)
@Jt+1
@t+1
(0; it+1) 
0 ( B (t; it))

= 0:
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G Induction hypotheses at time T
G.1 At time T + 1
Since
JT+1 () =
E[z]  g + 
w()  g +  ;
then JT+1 is maximized at T+1 = 
: Because E[z] > w(), JT+1 () > 1; establishing Induction
Hypothesis 2.
By denition, bT+1 satises T+1 bT+1 = 0 where
T+1 () = JT+1 ()  1 + (1  ) J 0T+1 () =
E[z]  g + 
w()  g +    1  (1  )
E[z]  g + 
(w()  g + )2w
0():
Because T+1 is a continuous and decreasing function on [
; 1] with T+1 (
) = JT+1 ()   1 > 0 and
lim!1 T+1 () =  1, then   bT+1 < 1. Moreover, since JT+1 is decreasing on [; 1], then J 0T+1 () < 0
for all  2 [; 1] : In particular, J 0T+1
bT+1 < 0: Finally, since T+1 bT+1 = 0, then
0 = T+1
bT+1 = JT+1 bT+1  1 + 1  bT+1 J 0T+1 bT+1  JT+1 bT+1  1;
implying that JT+1
bT+1  1:
G.2 At time T
Because 'T+1 (y) = JT+1 (y), Lemma 1 implies that full hedging is optimal whenever yT+1 (T ) 2 [aT+1; bT+1] :
Lemma 11 For any T 2
h
0; 
(4)
T
i
, yT+1 (T ) 2 [aT+1; bT+1].
Proof. First, it is shown that T+1 (T ) = 
 for all T  (1)T . Indeed, Equation (12) is
T (gT ; T ; dT ;T ) = D (T )

E[z]  1 + (1 + gT   )ET

E [z]  g + 
w (T+1)  g +    1

:
and is maximized if T+1 = 
 and gT is a large as possible. Therefore, for small values of T , gT (T ) = iT+
and the optimal dividend rate is such that yT+1 (T ; gT ; d

T ) = 
, that is, dT (T ) = E [z]+
 (1  ) iT 
 (T ). This situation is feasible if and only if dT (T ) is positive, implying that T 2
h
0; 
(1)
T (iT )
i
. For
T > 
(1)
T (iT ), the rm is already to endebted to pay dividends and y

T+1 (T ) is an increasing function of
T . Therefore, full hedging is the optimal decision until yT+1 (T ) reaches bT+1; that is, for all T < 
(4)
T : 
Because T (T ) = 1 for T 2
h
0; 
(4)
T
i
, the proof of Section A.3 holds, thus Proposition 1 is veried at
time T . Consequently, replacing the optimal controls into Equation (12) leads to the relative rm value at
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time T : JT (; iT ) =8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
D () (E[z]  iT + (1 + iT )JT+1 ()) if  2
h
0; 
(1)
T (iT )
i
D ()

E[z]  iT + (1 + iT )JT+1

()+iT E[z]
1+iT

if  2


(1)
T (iT ) ; 
(2)
T (iT )
i
D ()

E[z] +

JT+1
bT+1  1 E[z]+bT+1 ()
1 bT+1 + JT+1
bT+1 if  2 (2)T (iT ) ; (3)T i
D ()

E[z] +  + (1  )JT+1

()  E[z]
1 

if  2


(3)
T ; 
(4)
T
i
(30)
G.3 Verication of Induction Hypothesis 1 at time T
The concavity is veried by looking at the second derivative of JT which must be negative.
Starting from Equation 30, the second derivative is computed for each of the four intervals:
For T 2
h
0; 
(1)
T (iT )
i
,
@2Jt
@2t
(T ; iT ) =
D00 (T )
D (T )
JT (T ; iT ) < 0
because D00 (T ) < 0.
For T 2


(1)
T (iT ) ; 
(2)
T (iT )
i
;
@2JT
@2t
(T ; iT ) =
D00 (T )
D (T )
JT (T ; iT ) +
 
D (T ) (T )
00  D00 (T ) (T )

J 0T+1

 (T ) + iT   E [z]
1 + iT

+D (T )
(0 (T ))
2
1 + iT
J 00T+1

 (T ) + iT   E [z]
1 + iT

:
The rst term is negative since D and JT are positive and D
00 is negative. The second
term is negative because D00   D00 > 0 by assumption and T > (1)T (iT ) implies that
(T )+iT E[z]
1+iT
>



(1)
T (iT )

+iT E[z]
1+iT
= . Therefore, JT+1 being decreasing at the right of 
,
J 0T+1 < 0: Finally, the third term is negative if JT+1 is concave oni
T+1


(1)
T (iT )

; T+1


(2)
T (iT )
i
=
i
; bT+1i :
For T 2


(2)
T (iT ) ; 
(3)
T
i
,
@2JT
@2t
(T ; iT ) =
D00 (T )
D (T )
JT (T ; iT ) 
JT+1
bT+1  1
1  bT+1  D (T ) (T )00  D00 (T ) (T ) :
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Again, the rst term in negative for the same reasons as before. Because JT+1
bT+1 > 1
(see Appendix G.1) and D00  D00 > 0 by assumption, the second term is also negative.
Finally, for T 2


(3)
T ; 1
i
,
@2JT
@2t
(T ; iT ) =
D00 (T )
D (T )
JT (T ; iT ) +
 
D (T ) (T )
00  D00 (T ) (T )

J 0T+1

 (T )     E [z]
1  

+D (T )
(0 (T ))
2
1   J
00
T+1

 (T )     E [z]
1  

:
The two rst terms are negative. Since J 00T+1 remains negative until
(T )  E[z]
1  reaches
cT ; the third term is negative provided
(T )  E[z]
1   cT . Therefore, there is a constant
bT > 
(3)
T for which J

T is concave on [0; bT ] : 
G.4 Verication of the Induction Hypothesis 2 at time T
We will show that on [0; (3)t ], D
 1 (t) Jt (t; it)  1 + E[z]. As a consequence, since  2
[0; 
(3)
t ], then J

t (
; it)  1+E[z]1+w() > 1: The proof of Section A.6 is also valid for time T since
in Appendix G.1, we have shown that JT+1
 
T+1

> 1 and JT+1(bT+1) > 1.
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H Numerical Implementation for Multi-period Model
To implement the dynamic programming model (11b) ; one has to rely on a suboptimal
approximation. Consider a nite partition [l; l+1) of the  dimension such that 0 = 0 <
1 < : : : < N = 1: Given the discrete nature of the variable i, the state space takes values
on the grid:
G = f(l; im)j l = 0; : : : ; N and m = 1; : : : ; jM jg ;
where jj denotes the number of elements in the set.
Since the state space has been approximated by the grid G, ~Jt+1 denotes the approxima-
tion of Jt+1 that is available at each point of G. This means that the suboptimal dynamic
programming problem (11b) to solve for t = 1; : : : ; T   1 is the following:
~Jt
 
l; im

= max
gt;t
0gtit

1
1 + w (t)

E [z]  gt +  + (1 + gt   ) Elmt
h
~Jt+1 (t+1; it+1)
i
;
(31)
where Elmt [] stands for the conditional expectation at time t given that the state variables
where at
 
l; im

:
Given that the state space is continuous on the  dimension, and in order to compute
the recursion step in the Bellman equation, the cost-to-go function ~Jt+1 (t+1; it+1) has to be
approximated with some function so that the problem can be implemented numerically for
t = 1; :::; T   1.
The function ~Jt+1 is approximated with a piecewise quadratic interpolation on the 
dimension, which will be denoted by J^t+1:13 Other types of interpolation schemes can be used,
such as higher order polynomials, spline functions, or Laguerre approximations; however, in
the present case, these approximations will not contribute much to the precision of the results
but will render the implementation more complicated.
To solve (31), one needs to approximate the term Elmt [] : Suppose that at time t the
current state is (l; im) 2 G. Now, consider the following regions that partition the space
state:
Akj = f(; i)jj    j+1 and i = ikg ; j = 0; : : : ; N   1; k = 1; : : : ; jM j :
The value of ~Jt+1 (t+1; it+1) is approximated within each region by:
J^j;k;t+1 (t+1; ik) =  j;k;t + j;k;t (t+1   j) + j;k;t (t+1   j) (t+1   j+1) ; (32)
where  j;k;t; j;k;t; and j;k;t are dened in (38) ; (39) ; and (40) respectively. Then, one can
write the expected value of ~Jt+1 in terms of the regions Akj as:
Elmt
h
~Jt+1 (t+1; it+1)
i
'
N 1X
j=0
jM jX
k=0
Elmt
h
J^j;k;t+1 (t+1; it+1) I

Akj
	i
; (33)
13This kind of approximation has been use in the context of option pricing with a Brownian process in [2]
and for GARCH process in [1].
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where IfAkjg is the indicator function for the event (t+1; it+1) 2 Akj .
Working with Elmt
h
J^j;k;t+1 (t+1; it+1) I
Akj	i for j 2 f0; : : : ; N   2g, k 2 f0; : : : ; jM jg
and using (32), one has:
Elmt
h
J^j;k;t+1 (t+1; it+1) I
Akj	i =   j;k;t   j;k;tj + j;k;tjj+1Elmt I Akj	+ 
j;k;t   j;k;t (j + j+1)

Elmt

t+1I
Akj	
+j;k;tElmt

(t+1)
2 I
Akj	 : (34)
Combining (31) ; (33) ; and(34) gives:
~Jt
 
l; im
 ' max
gt;t
st:0gtit
8<: 11 + w (t)
0@E [zt]  gt + (1 + gt)N 1X
j=0
jM jX
k=0

~ j;k;tElmt

I
Akj	
+~j;k;tElmt

t+1I
Akj	+ j;k;tElmt (t+1)2 I Akj	o ; (35)
where ~ j;k;t and ~j;k;t are dened in as
~ j;k;t =  j;k;t   j;k;tj + j;k;tjj+1; (36)
~j;k;t = j;k;t   j;k;t (j + j+1) ; (37)
 j;k;t = ~Jt+1 (j; ik) ; (38)
j;k;t =
~Jt+1 (j+1; ik)  ~Jt+1 (j; ik)
j+1   j ; (39)
j;k;t =
(
( ~Jt+1(j ;ik)(j+2 j+1)  ~Jt+1(j+1;ik)(j+2 j)+ ~Jt+1(j+2;ik)(j+1 j))
(j+2 j+1)(j+2 j)(j+1 j) j < N   1
0 j = N   1
;(40)
respectively.
Given that the underlying source of volatility of the protability is assumed Gaussian,
closed-form expressions for Elmt

I
Akj	 ; Elmt t+1I Akj	 ; and Elmt (t+1)2 I Akj	 can
be computed.
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H.1 Expressions for expected values
This appendix presents closed-form expressions for the expected values Elmt

I
Akj	 ; Elmt t+1I Akj	 ;
and Elmt

(t+1)
2 I
Akj	 :
First, equation (5) implies that t+1 is a truncated normal variable over the interval [0; 1]
with expected value and variance conditional on t given by
E [t+1jt; gt; t] = t+1   t+1



1
t+1

  


0
t+1




1
t+1

  


0
t+1
 ; (41)
Var [t+1jt; gt; t] = 2t+1
0@1  1t+1


1
t+1

  0t+1


0
t+1




1
t+1

  


0
t+1
  
0@ 


1
t+1

  


0
t+1




1
t+1

  


0
t+1

1A2
1CA ;(42)
where
t+1 =
gt      z + t (1 + r (t)) + dt
1 + gt    ;
2t+1 =

1  t
1 + gt   
2
2z;

1
t+1 =
1 t+1
t+1
; 
0
t+1 =
 t+1
t+1
; and  and  are the density and cumulative distribution of
the normal variable.
Given the independence between z and i; the probability of being in a certain region
is equivalent to the multiplication of being in the region dened on the dimension of ;
multiplied by the probability of being in the state it+1 = ik; which is Pk: Consequently, one
has:
Elmt

I
Akj	 = P (j  t+1  j+1)Pk = 

~j+1

  

~j




1
t+1

  


0
t+1
Pk;
with ~
j
=
j t+1
t+1
; 
1
t+1 =
1 t+1
t+1
; and 0t+1 =
 t+1
t+1
:
To compute the terms Elmt

t+1I
Akj	 and Elmt (t+1)2 I Akj	 ; the moment gener-
ating function of the truncated normal is used:
M (t) = E

eXt
X 2 [1; 2] = et+2t22   2    t    1    t

 
2 

    1 

 ;
where  and  are the expected value and standard deviation of the normal distribution.
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Expressions for Elmt

t+1I
Akj	 with j 2 f0; : : : ; N   1g ; can be computed as follows:
Elmt

t+1I
Akj	 = Pk Z j+1
j
t+1
1
t+1
'

t+1 t+1
t+1




1
t+1

  


0
t+1
dt+1
= Pk


~j+1

  

~j




1
t+1

  


0
t+1
 Z j+1
j
t+1
1
t+1
'

t+1 t+1
t+1



~j+1

  

~j
dt+1
= Pk


~j+1

  

~j




1
t+1

  


0
t+1
E [t+1jt+1 2 [j; j+1]]
= Pk


~j+1

  

~j




1
t+1

  


0
t+1
 M 0 (t)jt=0
= Pk


~j+1

  

~j




1
t+1

  


0
t+1

0@t+1   t+1 '

~j+1

  '

~j



~j+1

  

~j

1A :
In a similar way, for j 2 f0; : : : ; N   2g one has:
Elmt

(t+1)
2 I
Akj	
= Pk


~j+1

  

~j

t+1

~

  t+1

~t+1
 M 00 (t)jt=0
= Pk


~j+1

  

~j

t+1

~

  t+1

~t+1

0@2t+1 + 2t+1   2t+1 ~j+1'

~j+1

  ~j'

~j



~j+1

  

~j
   2t+1t+1 '

~j+1

  '

~j



~j+1

  

~j

1A :
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Figure 5: WACC curve
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TheWACC curve is
w () =
0 + 1+ 2
2
1  
with 0 = 0:1287, 1 =  0:4159 and 2 = 0:5389:
With this specication,
w0 () =
0 + 1 + 22  22
(1  )2 and w
00 () = 2
0 + 1 + 2
(1  )3 :
Moreover,  = 0:31658 since it is the solution to w0 () = 0+1+22 2
2
(1 )2 = 0: The red line correspond
to E[z] :
I Numerical example
I.1 Notation and assumptions
I.2 The rms relative value at time T + 1
Parameter estimates. The following parameters have been estimated:
E [z] = 0:084
 = 0:058
 = 0:120
i = I = 0:126 + 0:021
g =  + 0:021
q = g   
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Figure 6: Discount factor
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The discount factor is
D () =
1
1 + w ()
=
1  
(1 + 0)  (1  1)+ 22
The concavity is veried by the mean of its second derivative which should be negative:
D0 () =
  (0 + 1)  22+ 22 
(1 + 0)  (1  1)+ 22
2
D00 () =
 2  (0 + 1 + 2) + 0 (2   1)  21+ 62 (0 + 1)+ 6222   2223 
(1 + 0)  (1  1)+ 22
3
Figure 7: Interest rate
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The interest rate r is
r () = (1  ) 0 + 1
1  
with 0 = 0:077 and 1 =  0:0248 and the taxation rate  = 0:40:
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Figure 8: Debt and interest paiment by unit of invested capital
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The debt and interest paiment by unit of invested capital function  is
 () =  (1 + r ()) =  (1  )

1 + 0   (1  1)
1  

:
Properties of  () are veried using its two rst derivatives:
0 () =
(1 + 0)  2 (1  1)+ (1  1)2
(1  )2 = (1  )
 
1  1 + 0 + 1
(1  )2
!
;
00 () = 2 (1  ) (0 + 1)
(1  )3 :
Therefore,  () is convex if and only if 0 + 1 > 0. Moreover, 1 < 1 and 0 + 1 > 0 implies that  is
increasing.
Figure 9: ...
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Figure 10: Continuation value at time T+1
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The continuation value at time T + 1 is
JT+1 (T+1) =
E [z]  g + 
w (T+1)  g +  :
Note that J 0T+1 (
) = 0 implies that  = l = 0:316 58:
Figure 11: Partial derivative of the value function with respect to the investment level
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
-2
0
2
lambda
phi
b is the solution to b = 0 where
 () = JT+1 ()  1 + (1  ) J 0T+1 ()
=
E [z]  (g   )
w ()  (g   )   1 + (1  )
 
  E [z]  (g   )
(w ()  (g   ))2
 
0 + 1 + 22  22
(1  )2
!!
In this application, b = L = 0:323 87
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Figure 12: Leverages thresholds at maturity
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In this numerical case
i = I = 0:147  = l = 0:31658
g    = 0:021 b = L = 0:323 87
 = 0:12 b = 0:763 37
 () (black),
E [z] +    (1  ) i = 0:300 12 (light blue) ) (1)T (i) = 0:283 51,
E [z] +  = 0:400 58 (dark blue - dashed) ) (1)T (0) = 0:376 1,b  (1  b)i+ E [z] = 0:308 48 (light green) ) (2)T (i) = 0:291 27,b+ E [z] = 0:407 87 (green - dashed) ) (2)T (0) = 0:382 75,
E [z] + b (1  ) +  = 0:489 01 (red) ) (3)T = 0:455 97;
E [z] + b (1  ) +  = 0:875 77 (purple) ) b = 0:763 37.
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